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Preface
This FAC Working Paper is part of the first phase of a collab-
orative research project of the Science, Technology and 
Innovation (STI) Theme of the Future Agricultures 
Consortium (FAC). It was funded through a grant from 
the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID). The project explored the political economy of 
cereal seed systems across five distinct country contexts 
– Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Ghana and Zimbabwe – during 
2009-10. The evolution of seed research and develop-
ment programmes and processes has varied greatly 
across these countries. In each case, a unique set of public 
and private actors and interests has been involved in 
defining priorities in seed policy and implementing proj-
ects, each seeking to influence those agendas to their 
advantage. Moreover, each country has a different reli-
ance on ‘modern’ hybrid (or sometimes biotech) varieties 
and associated R&D and supply systems and an inde-
pendent informal sector, involving networks of farmer 
experimenters and seed bulkers and suppliers, with 
varying degrees of capacity.
As calls for a ‘Uniquely African Green Revolution’ gain 
momentum, the focus on seeds and seed systems is rising 
up the agricultural policy agenda. Much of the debate 
stresses the technological or market dimensions, with 
substantial investments being made in seed improve-
ment and the development of both public and private 
sector delivery systems. But there is currently much less 
emphasis on the wider policy dimensions – and particu-
larly the political economy of policymaking in these 
diverse agricultural contexts.
Experience tells us it is these factors that often make 
or break even the best designed and most well inten-
tioned intervention. And since investment in seed 
improvement and supply was last emphasised as a major 
priority in agriculture (in the 1970s and 80s), contexts 
have changed dramatically. The collapse of national 
public sector breeding systems has been dramatic, and 
this has only partially been compensated for by the selec-
tive entry of the private sector. Large multinational seed 
and agricultural supply companies are increasingly domi-
nating the global scene, and there are many claims made 
about the promises of new technologies (notably trans-
genics) transforming the seed sector through a techno-
logical revolution. While informal breeding and seed 
supply systems continue to exist, and indeed have been 
extensively supported through NGOs and other civil 
society groups, they are often under pressure, as drought, 
corruption and conflict take their toll and economic 
transformation and livelihood change continues apace, 
or they are ignored or excluded from policy circles.
The focus on cereal seed systems allowed this project 
to concentrate on a similar set of crops across the five 
study countries with a key influence on food security at 
household and national levels. Given the political rever-
berations of the ‘food crisis’ of 2007-08, this enabled 
timely analysis of the implications of the policy processes 
shaping the breeding, production, marketing and distri-
bution of cereal seeds. As this FAC Working Paper shows, 
whether grown for local subsistence or traded commer-
cially, the significance of cereal crops to national politics 
(and therefore arguments about food security and sover-
eignty), commercial interests and local livelihoods is 
profound.
To gain clear insights into the policy actors, networks, 
interests and narratives at play, this project sought to 
test the hypothesis that contrasting politics and different 
configurations of interests will affect the way cereal seed 
systems operate and shape how a ‘New Green Revolution’ 
will ultimately play out. As such, the five country studies 
analysed their respective national seed policy processes 
by asking:
 • How do seed policies get created, and by whom? 
 • How do ideas about what makes a ‘good seed policy’ 
change over time?
 • How are boundaries drawn around seed problems and 
policy ‘storylines’ elaborated? 
 • Whose voices are taken into account in the seed policy 
process? And whose are excluded? 
 • What spaces exist for new ideas, actors and networks? 
How can these be opened up?
The underlying implication in all these cases is that 
politics matter and that by engaging critically with seed 
policy processes, we can begin to define and then delib-
erate among different framings and interests to shift the 
focus of the debate beyond the usual technical/market 
fix.
John Thompson and Ian Scoones, Project Co-ordinators 
(August 2010)
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Abstract
The Government of Kenya, with the backing of develop-
ment and charitable organisations, has been imple-
menting programmes to increase agricultural productivity 
and rural incomes and trigger a new Green Revolution 
(GR). These activities focus on increasing farmers’ access 
to and application of modern farming inputs, particularly 
improved seeds and fertilisers, delivered mainly through 
agro-dealers. Given that Kenyan farmers operate in a 
highly heterogeneous environment, this study was moti-
vated to ask: Can agro-dealers deliver the Green 
Revolution in Kenya? In answering this question, the 
study examined the evolution and characteristics of agro-
dealers in the cereals subsector and explored how they 
command a central position in policy narratives put 
forward by key actors in the policy arena, each advocating 
a new GR for Kenya. 
Several key findings emanate from this study. First, 
both formal and informal seed systems are important 
channels for delivering cereal seeds to Kenyan farmers. 
The informal systems (which do not involve agro-dealers) 
provide seeds of local maize and other cereals to farmers 
in low rainfall areas in the greater Eastern region of the 
country. Conversely, the formal systems use agro-dealers 
in providing mainly improved maize seed to farmers in 
high rainfall areas of the greater Western and Central 
regions of the country. Notwithstanding the importance 
of the informal systems to many smallholder farmers, 
the legal, regulatory and policy frameworks, which are 
informed by international seed policies and conventions, 
tend to favour the formal systems. As a result, agro-
dealers may only spur a GR for a select group of privileged 
producers, mainly maize farmers operating in higher 
rainfall areas. 
Second, while actors in the seed industry employ 
different approaches in their activities, they are driven 
by narratives put forward by particular key actors, all 
converging on the notion of the ‘agro-dealer’ as the 
carrier of improved seeds to farmers. Interestingly, while 
the actors promote the agro-dealer agenda, due to 
different politics and interests, they also support parallel 
activities that seem to undermine development and 
expansion of the agro-dealer network in some places. 
Third, Kenyan agro-dealers engage in the sale and 
promotion of diverse commodities as a risk coping 
mechanism for business survival. Therefore, initiatives 
aimed at supporting agro-dealers ought to focus on the 
totality of the business instead of only seeds and 
fertilisers. As well, if agro-dealers are to deliver a GR in 
Kenya, capacity training programmes for agro-dealers 
should not only target the business owners but also 
‘managers’ (i.e., those who actually serve customers and 
are responsible for dispensing advice and information 
as well as products). 
Fourth, the universalising of agro-dealer narrative in 
GR programmes overlooks the heterogeneity of the ‘poor 
smallholder farmers’ and agro-dealers themselves. This 
has resulted in biased beneficiary targeting and dispro-
portionate ‘wins’ for farmers and agro-dealers in high 
rainfall areas and large agro-dealers in low rainfall areas. 
Therefore, greater attention must be paid to meeting 
the needs of farmers in lower potential areas by devel-
oping innovative alternative business models. Such 
models might include sale of complementary non-agri-
cultural products or services or the establishment of 
group-based agro which might operate part-time or on 
a not-for-profit basis as a service to their community. 
Alternatively, mobile agro-dealers might provide regular 
or periodic services to more remote areas that cannot 
sustain permanent agro-dealerships. In short, efforts 
must be made to move away from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
agro-dealer model as it is currently construed.                                       
Finally, the GR programmes have been viewed by 
critics as a ‘Trojan horse’ for genetically modified (GM) 
seeds or simply a strategy to ‘roll out a gene revolution’ 
in Africa. As these new seeds have yet to be released 
widely, the extent to which agro-dealers have the knowl-
edge and ability to coordinate local-level implementation 
of national biosafety regulations has yet to be determined 
and it therefore remains an area requiring further inves-
tigation. Given their limited capacity to provide timely 
advice and information on non-GM technologies to the 
majority of Kenya’s farmers, however, it is clear that careful 
consideration is needed before loading agro-dealers with 
even greater responsibilities and expectations.
1. Introduction
In a bid to return the country to food self-sufficiency, the 
Government of Kenya has been spearheading strategies 
for a ‘Green Revolution’ in the food producing sector as 
spelt out in the Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture (SRA), 
a 10-year plan, launched in 2004 (Republic of Kenya 2004), 
and entrenched in the Vision 20301 . Key among these 
strategies is the increased generation, promotion and 
use of modern farming inputs and technologies, particu-
larly improved seed and fertiliser. Small-scale, indepen-
dent stockists, referred to as ‘agro-dealers’, are seen to 
have a crucial role in distributing these inputs in a liber-
alised economy. As key actors in the new ‘Green 
Revolution’, agro-dealers are thus at the centre of the 
current policy discussion about the future of Kenya’s 
cereal sector. 
This paper charts the rise of agro-dealers in recent 
national policy debates on agricultural innovation and 
food security and explores how they command a central 
position in new efforts to spark a smallholder-led revolu-
tion. It also examines the major narratives put forward 
by key actors in the agricultural policy arena and the 
competing agendas and visions of a new Green 
Revolution for Kenya they represent. Finally, drawing on 
key informant interviews and a survey of agro-dealers 
in two districts, the paper assesses the different politics 
and interests at play and the implications these raise for 
future investments in formal and informal seed systems 
and the promotion of agro-dealers as catalysts of change 
in the agricultural sector. 
Agriculture is among the most important sectors in 
Kenya, contributing about 24 percent of the national 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and supporting about 80 
percent of the population (Kibaara 2006). The main 
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feature of the sector is its domination by small-scale 
farmers, who account for 75% of total agricultural produc-
tion (Kinyua 2004). Cereals are the most critical crops for 
food security in the country. Maize, wheat, sorghum, 
millet, rice, barley and oats are the seven cereal crops 
grown in Kenya. Of these, maize is the most widely grown, 
occupying about 50 percent of total cultivated area and 
78 percent of total area under cereals. Sorghum and 
wheat are each grown in 7 percent of the total cereal 
area, while the cereal area share of millets is 6 percent. 
Rice, barley and oats together occupy about 2 percent 
of total cereal area2. Maize is hence the most important 
cereal and staple crop in the country. 
Productivity trends in Kenya show a marginal increase 
in aggregate cereal3 yields from an average of 1.3 tonnes/
ha in early 1960s to about 1.7 tonnes/ha in the mid 2000s 
(see FAOSTAT). The initial growth in cereal output in the 
early 1960s through the late 1970s was attributed mainly 
to expansion in area under production, since aggregate 
productivity of major cereals remained relatively 
constant. However, in the mid 1970s through the early 
1990s, maize yields rose steadily from 1.3 to 1.8 tonnes 
per hectare, and this growth in yields was attributable 
to government support through investment in research, 
extension and use of modern inputs such as improved 
seeds, fertilisers and chemicals (Odhiambo et al. 2004). 
In the late 1980s through early 1990s, the government 
embarked on radical donor-driven liberalisation policy 
reforms meant to significantly reduce its involvement in 
economic activities. Although it had been hoped that 
these policies would bring about increased agricultural 
output and productivity, this was not achieved (Nyoro 
2002). Aggregate cereal production declined after liber-
alisation, from 3.1 million tonnes in the 1987 to 2.5 million 
tonnes in 1993 and remained below its pre-liberalisation 
level until the mid 2000s. Similarly, aggregate cereal 
yields declined from the pre-liberalisation average of 
about 1.6 tonnes/ha to 1.4 tonnes/ha in the late 1990s, 
before climbing steadily to 1.6 tonnes/ha in the 2005. 
(Appendix 1) 
A key impact of liberalisation on food security is that 
the output of maize and other main cereals has remained 
below consumption requirements, making the country 
a net food importer and prone to perennial food inse-
curity (Appendix 2). Mose et al. (1997) and Nyangito et 
al. (2004) attribute this to weaknesses in and low effi-
ciency of technology development and transfer due to 
inadequate government investment in research and 
extension; unfavourable legal framework; underdevel-
oped private sector; inadequate linkages among agri-
cultural sector agencies; high cost of farm inputs; poor 
marketing and infrastructure; limited access to credit; 
and ethnic conflicts. Thus both studies recognise the poor 
performance of the agricultural sectors as a result of 
post-liberalisation political, structural and economic 
constraints.
The agricultural sector performed dismally in the 
1990s, plunging into the sub-zero growth rates by the 
year 2000 (Nyoro and Ariga 2004).  Following this, the 
government began calls for a turn-around of the sector 
in the early 2000s, culminating in the preparation of a 
policy document dubbed The Strategy for Revitalizing 
Agriculture (SRA), by the Ministries of Agriculture, and 
Livestock and Fisheries Development (Republic of Kenya 
2004). The SRA greatly emphasises the need to increase 
farmers’ access to high quality modern farming inputs, 
among them seeds, fertilisers and pesticides; in a bid to 
increase agricultural productivity and consequently 
achieve a Green Revolution in Kenya.   
In the context of a liberalised economy that Kenya is, 
agro-dealers are seen to have a crucial role in distributing 
these inputs to farmers. As key actors in the new Green 
Revolution, agro-dealers are thus at the centre of policy 
discussion about the future of the cereal sector. However, 
Figure 1. Map of Kenya showing the study districts
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while it may be convenient in policy to present Kenyan 
(smallholder) farmers as a homogeneous group, they 
are practically heterogeneous in terms of agro-ecological, 
economic and socio-cultural environments in which they 
operate and their preferred crop enterprises. In this 
context, a critical question that must be answered is: Can 
agro-dealers deliver the Green Revolution in Kenya? 
In a bid to answer the above question, this paper 
examines the evolution and characteristics of agro-
dealers in the cereals subsector and explores how they 
command a central position in policy narratives put 
forward by key actors in the policy arena, each advocating 
a new Green Revolution for Kenya. Taking a historical 
and political economy perspective, the paper assesses 
the different politics and interests at play, and the impli-
cations this has for seed systems and the role of agro-
dealers in particular. 
Several techniques were employed to gather, analyse 
and present information in this study. These included an 
extensive review of relevant literature from published 
works and websites of key organisations; mapping actor 
network in Kenya’s cereal seed systems to identify key 
actors, their roles and relations (see maps of actor-
networks for the period before and after fieldwork in 
Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively); analysis of 
narratives in policy documents of key organisations and 
programmes; semi-structured discussions with key infor-
mants and actors in the cereal seed sector; an agro-dealer 
survey involving 55 purposefully selected agro-dealers 
in Uasin Gishu and Machakos  districts4 representing high 
and low rainfall areas in Rift Valley and Eastern Provinces 
respectively (Figure 1); and three case studies of recent 
programmes being implemented in the country, with 
the agro-dealer at the core. Field research and interviews 
for this study were conducted between September 2009 
and February 2010.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 
two puts the Kenyan Green Revolution philosophy, key 
actors and actor networks into context, by assessing its 
foundations and technology delivery mechanisms. In 
section three, cereal seed systems in Kenya are examined, 
highlighting the various actors and their networks, and 
how their activities and interests shape the agro-deal-
ership. Section four looks at agro-dealers in Kenya’s cereal 
seed systems, by presenting the results of an agro-dealer 
study, which define and characterise them. In section 
five, three Green Revolution programmes driving the 
agro-dealer agenda in cereal seed systems are assessed, 
while the findings of the this study are synthesised in 
the final section.
2. The Kenyan Green 
Revolution 
 2.1. Foundations and Support
Kenya’s Green Revolution, as indicated above, is anchored 
in the SRA, which was inspired by the Economic Recovery 
Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-
2007– ERS (a broader policy initiative for improving the 
overall economic and social development in the country), 
and the Millennium Development Goal number 1, which 
aims to eradicate  extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 
(Republic of Kenya 2004). Noting that agriculture contrib-
uted more than half of the country’s GDP directly and 
indirectly, and supported about four fifths of the coun-
try’s population, the government linked the then dismal 
performance of the overall economy directly to the 
underperformance of the agricultural sector, and postu-
lated in the SRA that ‘to significantly reduce poverty and 
unemployment in Kenya, a Green Revolution-type action 
is required’. In the foreword of the SRA, the president of 
the Republic of Kenya, Hon. Mwai Kibaki, declared that 
‘the implementation of the strategy will be the beginning 
of a Green Revolution in Kenya’ (Republic of Kenya 2004). 
The notion of a Green Revolution encompasses signifi-
cant increase in agricultural productivity, emanating from 
widespread application of modern inputs such as high-
yielding crop varieties, mineral fertilisers and pesticides 
(Cartridge and Leraand 2007). As envisaged in the SRA, 
the Kenyan Green Revolution strategy aims to raise real 
agricultural output by 3.1 percent in 2003-2007 and by 
5.0 percent thereafter. The strategies employed address 
three key constraints to agricultural productivity, which 
include inadequate productivity-enhancing technolo-
gies; high input costs; and inadequate knowledge on 
available appropriate technologies and husbandry tech-
niques among farmers (Republic of Kenya 2005).    
Similar calls for a Green Revolution-type action in the 
country have been echoed by a number of actors, key 
among them being the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). USAID supports a 
number of projects in the country through its Agriculture 
and Micro-enterprise programme, whose agricultural 
component has as its first objective ‘increased agricultural 
productivity in maize, dairy and horticultural subsectors’ 
(USAID 2009: para. 3). Among the main projects funded 
by USAID in Kenya’s maize subsector is the Kenya Maize 
Development Program (KMDP). The programme has 
been implemented since 2001 by Agricultural Cooperative 
Development International/Volunteers in Overseas 
Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA), a Washington-
based international non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), in partnership with Cereal Growers Association 
(CGA), Farm Input Promotion Services Africa Ltd (FIPS) 
and Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange (KACE). 
Implementation of the KMDP is anchored in the belief 
that, coupled with a number of other factors, increased 
maize productivity can ‘dramatically alter the economic 
contribution of the subsector’ in economic growth and 
poverty reduction (ACDI/VOCA 2009a). The first objective 
of the KMDP is increased productivity, which is achieved 
through promoting increased adoption of improved 
maize varieties, fertilisers and agronomic practices 
among smallholder farmers. However, the productivity 
increasing activities of the programme are limited to 
regions considered as ‘critical’ or ‘important’ maize 
growing areas, under the programme. These include the 
high rainfall areas of Rift Valley, Western, Central and 
Nyanza Provinces (ACDI/VOCA 2009b). 
The other significant supporter of the government’s 
call for a Green Revolution is the World Bank (WB). In the 
World Development Report for 2008, the WB’s President 
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remarked that ‘agricultural productivity growth is vital 
for stimulating growth in other parts of the economy’... 
and ‘a strong option for … overcoming poverty and 
enhancing food security’ (World Bank 2007: xiii). He envis-
aged that this agricultural growth will come from ‘sharp 
productivity increase in smallholder farming combined 
with more effective support to the millions coping as 
subsistence farmers, many of them in remote areas’ 
(World Bank 2007: xiii). In line with this philosophy, albeit 
retrospectively, the bank has supported the Government 
of Kenya in implementing projects aimed at increasing 
agricultural productivity and food security.
Among the key WB-funded agricultural projects in 
Kenya is the 12-year Kenya Agricultural Productivity 
Project (KAPP), for which the Bank committed US$40 
million in the initial 3-year phase and a further US$82 
million in the second phase5. Started in 2004, the project 
aims to:
The project’s development objective is to improve 
the system supporting generation, dissemination, 
and adoption of agricultural technology through: 
(a) reforms in extension to increase pluralism, 
responsiveness to clients, and participation by 
private providers; (b) evolutionary change in the 
existing system of agricultural research to improve 
accountability and impact; and, (c) increased 
empowerment of producer organizations to influ-
ence the planning, design, implementation, funding 
and monitoring and evaluation of research, exten-
sion, training and capacity building activities.  
(World Bank 2004: 2)
Yet, another ardent supporter of Kenya’s Green 
Revolution call is the powerful Nairobi-based donor 
organisation, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA) – a partnership between the Rockefeller 
Foundation and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. In 
his speech delivered at the International Conference on 
Food Security in Abuja, Nigeria on 23-24 July 2008, AGRA’s 
Vice President Dr. Akinwumi Adesina asserted that AGRA 
is ‘dedicated to helping millions lift themselves out of 
poverty and hunger by dramatically improving the 
productivity ... of small-scale farmers across Africa’ (AGRA 
2009b: para. 15). Since 2006, AGRA has been champi-
oning agricultural development in African countries, 
including Kenya. Through its Programme for Africa’s 
Seeds Systems (PASS), funded to the tune of $150 million 
over the initial five years, AGRA aims to ‘develop seed 
systems that deliver new crop varieties to smallholder 
farmers efficiently, equitably and sustainably’ (AGRA 
2009e). An example of AGRA’s Green Revolution 
programmes in Kenya is presented in section 5.
Kenya’s Green Revolution campaign is also imple-
mented under strong political pressure from the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program 
(CAADP), the highest policy framework for accelerating 
agricultural development and food security in Africa, 
established under the AU/NEPAD, African Union’s New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (COMESA 
Programmes 2009). Established in 2003 as the product 
of the so called ‘Maputo Declaration’, CAADP targets to 
raise national agricultural growth rates to an average of 
six percent per year. Under this initiative, member coun-
tries have committed themselves to increase resource 
allocation to Agriculture and Rural Development to at 
least 10 percent of national budgets to support among 
other activities, improvement in agricultural research; 
technology dissemination and adoption (see the fourth 
pillar of CAADP). 
Implementation of CAADP in Kenya is strongly linked 
to increased budgetary allocation to Agriculture sector, 
from 4.6 percent of the national budget in 2004/05 finan-
cial year, to 7.8 percent in 2007/08 (Institute of Economic 
Affairs 2008; Kibaara et al. 2009b). Further increase in 
budgetary allocation in coming years is expected as the 
country focuses on implementing the Vision 2030 policy. 
For instance, in his speech during the opening of the 
2nd Biannual National Agriculture Sector Conference in 
Nairobi on 11th November 2008, the President of the 
Republic of Kenya, Hon. Mwai Kibaki stated: ‘we are ready 
to increase the funds allocated to the agricultural sector 
so as to improve the sector…’, and promised to increase 
agriculture’s budgetary allocation to 8 percent of the 
national budget (Office of Public Communications: para. 
3).
However, doubts are being raised as to whether 
increased budgetary allocation will automatically lead 
to realisation of the new Green Revolution. For instance, 
recent CAADP implementation country reports by the 
Global and Regional Advocacy for Small Producers 
(GRASP)6 show that even countries that had achieved 10 
percent budgetary allocation to agriculture had not 
attained the targeted 6 percent growth rates (GRASP 
2009). GRASP argues that performance of agricultural 
sector will be determined by the kind of agricultural and 
development policies that countries pursue and how 
well they are targeted; regulatory frameworks and macro-
economic policies; exogenous factors such as weather 
and global prices; and opportunities presented to small 
holder farmers by the private sector and donor commu-
nity. Other factors that may negatively affect or delay 
outcomes of the CAADP and hence Green Revolution in 
Kenya are lack of the agriculture sector ministries’ capacity 
to utilize the incremental funds (Institute of Economic 
Affairs 2008) and politics within the implementation 
circles of the SRA and CAADP, where some members of 
teams coordinating agricultural programmes see CAADP 
as a parallel programme to the SRA (Kibaara et al. 2009b).
This section has revealed the increased use of modern 
technologies as a common key objective in Green 
Revolution narratives. However, policy challenges 
abound with respect to how the technologies would be 
availed especially to the poor smallholder farmers, in 
order to realize the envisaged productivity growth. The 
next section explores the different pathways that have 
been used in the country to deliver improved inputs to 
farmers, particularly fertilisers and seeds, in order to shed 
light on key actors and interests driving the Green 
Revolution agenda in Kenya. It also highlights pathways 
that are likely to be pursued by different actors in future 
and how these might impact on agro-dealership and 
input accessibility for small farmers. 
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2.2. Delivering the Technologies for the 
New Green Revolution
Different input channels have been used to deliver the 
various technologies for the new Green Revolution.  The 
main channels that have been used in Kenya include 
public institutions, involving state corporations and 
public extension system; commercial channels, involving 
private seed companies and their networks of distribu-
tors (agro-dealers); and charitable organisations, 
involving donor agencies, non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and relief agencies. The predominant actors 
and channels have changed with the shift from a public 
input distribution system to a fully liberalised system. 
Public input distribution and information dissemina-
tion system was dominant in the pre-liberalisation period, 
controlling seed variety development and production, 
and pricing and marketing of inputs (Argwings-Kodhek 
et al. 2004; Ochieng pers. comm. 2009). The main actors 
in cereal inputs arena were the Kenya Agricultural 
Research Institute (KARI), which was mandated to 
develop new crop varieties and implement the seed 
industry laws; the Kenya Seed Company (KSC), which 
produced and distributed the new cereal varieties devel-
oped by KARI; the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA), later 
renamed Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative Union 
(KGGCU), which procured and distributed fertilisers and 
other inputs, and acted as an agent for KSC; the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) which advanced 
inputs credit to farmers; and the National Cereals and 
Produce Board (NCPB) which bought cereal grain from 
producers and recovered input credit advanced to 
farmers on behalf of AFC.
This system, however, mostly benefited the large scale 
cereal producers and farmers in high rainfall areas, who 
were also well served by good infrastructure, particularly 
in Rift Valley and Central Kenya (Freeman and Omiti 2003; 
Nyangito 2008). In the mid 1980s, however, mismanage-
ment and political interference at KGGCU resulted in 
inefficiencies that brought down this input distribution 
system (Nyoro 2002). This failure of the public distribution 
system triggered the push for liberalisation of the cereal 
input sector, especially by the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1990, the govern-
ment abolished import quotas and licenses and deregu-
lated prices in fertiliser industry (Omamo and Mose 1999). 
The liberalisation policies also allowed traders to break 
down the traditional 50 kg bags into small packs, in the 
hope that this would spur the use of fertiliser and increase 
productivity among smallholder farmers (Freeman and 
Omiti 2003).  In 1996, the seed industry became fully 
liberalised and an autonomous industry regulator, the 
Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services (KEPHIS) was 
established to take over the regulatory role from KARI 
(Ochieng pers. comm. 2009). 
Liberalisation policies were meant to pave the way 
for a market-based economy in which the private sector 
would take over functions such as input distribution from 
the state. Following liberalisation in Kenya, private 
companies and urban and rural traders entered the 
inputs market, dismantling the monopolistic network 
of public actors in input distribution in most parts of the 
country. However, market development has been slow 
due to capital constraints, restrictive trade and licensing 
arrangements and restrictive domestic laws in the seed 
industry, as stipulated in the SRA (Republic of Kenya 
2004). This has led to inadequate competition and conse-
quently high input prices, constraining the adoption of 
improved technologies by poor smallholder farmers, 
especially in low rainfall areas. As the next sections reveal, 
the government is not about to exit from input distribu-
tion. In fact, there have been calls, for instance by AGRA, 
for African governments to facilitate access to inputs by 
resource-poor smallholder farmers through input subsi-
dies (AGRA 2009d).  Thus, in the recent past, the Kenyan 
government has been actively involved in input distribu-
tion programmes, with backing from development part-
ners such as AGRA, the World Bank and FAO. 
In a bid to bridge the gaps created by input markets, 
another input distribution system emerged in the early 
1990s in the form of seed aid, championed by local and 
international NGOs and relief agencies. These organisa-
tions have been working mainly in the low rainfall areas 
and areas affected by disasters such as droughts, floods 
and civil unrest. The organisations employ strategies such 
as direct input distribution and market-based approaches 
such as seed vouchers and fairs (Sperling et al. 2008). 
The key actors who undertake relief seed distribution 
include the government and philanthropic organisations, 
key among them being Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 
Action Aid, World Vision, the Kenya Red Cross Society 
and several local NGOs. However, relief seed programs 
are have been accused of lacking sensitivity to local seed 
systems; creating dependency in farmers; distorting 
prices and undermining the growth of local seed markets; 
and reliance on unsustainable external support (Tripp 
2001; Muhammad et al. 2003).
In this section we have sought to demonstrate how 
a strong core coalition of actors has emerged in Kenya, 
focused on stimulating a new Green Revolution through 
the application of new technologies, particularly seeds 
and fertilisers, delivered by the private sector (multina-
tional and local seed companies) with backing from the 
state, donors and philanthropic organisations. This core 
actor network sees agro-dealers as central. In order to 
contextualise the role of agro-dealers, however, the wider 
cereal seed system needs to be understood, together 
with the key actors involved in seed policy. The next 
section looks at the cereal seed systems and actors actor-
networks in Kenya and how their positioning, interests 
and activities shape the cereal seed sector in general 
and agro-dealership in particular.
3. Actors and Networks in 
Kenya’s Cereal Seed 
Systems7
3.1. The Main Cereal Seed Systems
In Kenya, there are two interacting and overlapping types 
of seed systems: the formal and informal. Formal seed 
systems are also collectively known as the organized 
sector or the formal seed sector and are generally 
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represented by all official or organized seed production 
and supply programmes. In these systems, activities 
along the entire seed value chain are guided by defined 
methodologies which are also internationally standard-
ized, and backed by national legislation. As shown in 
Table 1, the formal seed sector supplies about 60 percent 
of cereal seed used in the country. However, this figure 
varies depending on the crop, with seeds for production 
of cereal crops other than maize coming mainly from 
the informal sector. In addition, use of formal maize seed, 
which ranges from 0 percent in coastal lowlands to 90 
percent in high potential maize zone, is concentrated in 
high rainfall areas found mainly in Central, Rift Valley and 
Western Provinces8 (Figure 2).
The formal seed sector boasts of about 445 registered 
varieties, of which about 50 percent are of cereal crops 
(KEPHIS 2009). The 222 cereal crops varieties are domi-
nated by maize, which has 164 varieties (74 percent), 
followed by wheat with 21 varieties (9.5 percent), 
sorghum with 18 varieties (8 percent), millet with 7 vari-
eties (3 percent), barley with 7 varieties (3 percent) and 
rice with 5 varieties (2 percent). However, about three 
quarters of the registered maize varieties are suitable for 
medium to high altitude areas, which also receive high 
rainfall; whereas only about one quarter of the varieties 
are suitable for the low altitude areas, most of which also 
receive low and erratic rainfall.
Kenya’s formal seed systems exhibit several constraints 
that limit their effectiveness in delivering improved seed 
to farmers for the realisation of a Green Revolution. These 
include:
 • inadequate information about availability, character-
istics and performance of new varieties among both 
farmers agro-dealers; 
 • low and unpredictable seed demand, particularly 
among the poor smallholder farmers and those in low 
rainfall areas, leading to low availability of improved 
seeds in such areas; 
 • distant and unreliable seed sources, which increase 
seed costs for  farmers; 
 • high retail prices compared to informal seed, making 
adequate formal seed unaffordable by most farmers; 
 • poor quality of formal seed despite the stringent seed 
certification and quality control mechanisms enforced 
by KEPHIS; and
 • tendency of the formal seed systems to focus on maize 
hybrids and high rainfall areas, giving less attention 
to open pollinated varieties (OPV) and other dryland 
crops. 
Informal seed systems, also known as farmer seed 
systems, local seed supply or traditional seed sector, are 
comprised of farmer-managed seed production activities 
and are based on indigenous knowledge and local diffu-
sion mechanisms. The systems include methods such as 
retaining seed on-farm and farmer-to-farmer seed 
exchange networks. Farmer seed systems do not strictly 
distinguish between ‘seed’ and ‘grain’: seed production 
is essentially the same as and part of grain production. 
‘Seed’ is normally selected from grain crop, based on 
physical characteristics observed in the farm. These seed 
systems operate mainly at the community level and 
because of their local specificity to needs and preferences 
Table 1. Seed demand and supply situation for main cereal crops in Kenya (2005)
Crop Total seed Demand 
(tons)
Formal Seed Supply 
(tons)
Proportion of 
Formal seed (%)
Proportion of 
Informal seed (%)
Maize 44,015 27,500 62 38
Sorghum 1,224 433 35 65
Millet 739 175 24 76
Rice 1,275 300 24 76
Total 47,253 28,408 60 40
Source: Adapted from Ayieko and Tschirley (2006)
Figure 2. Use of formal maize seed in different agro-regions of Kenya (2004)
Source: Authors, using data from Ayieko and Tschirley (2006)
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of farmers; they provide most of the cereal seed that 
farmers use, with exception of maize hybrids and high 
rainfall areas. Farmers access informal cereal seeds mainly 
from their own farms, other farmers, local grain markets, 
NGOs, CBOs and relief agencies.
The informal seed sector, just like the formal sector 
faces a number of weaknesses. The main constraints 
include:
 • lack of adequate seeds to meet farmers’ needs, occa-
sioned by low grain production and  utilisation of grain 
meant for seed as food after prolonged droughts;
 • poor linkage of informal systems with public research 
and formal seed sector, resulting to severe difficulties 
in accessing seed of new improved varieties to replace 
existing ones; and
 • lack of skills and capacity among most farmers to effec-
tively maintaining high genetic purity in cross polli-
nated crops and control seed borne diseases and 
humidity problems in storage, thereby jeopardising 
seed quality.
Notwithstanding their advantages and challenges, 
informal seed systems get little support particularly from 
the government, compared to the formal systems. For 
instance, informal seed is not recognised by law and 
trading in uncertified seeds is prohibited according to 
Regulation 17(1) of the Seeds and Plant Varieties (Seeds) 
Regulations, 2009. Further, all provisions of the existing 
seed legislation regarding seed production, processing, 
packaging and distribution are based on international 
seed laws, whose domestication has resulted in local seed 
legislation that by and large is not conducive for develop-
ment of the informal system. The provisions of these laws 
imply that the almost 80 percent of all seed used in Kenya, 
which is informal, is technically ‘illegal’ (Ayieko and 
Tschirley 2006). 
The Ministry of Agriculture’s policy is to encourage 
farmers to grow improved crop varieties and use certified 
seeds. Therefore, the Ministry does not have elaborate 
programs for supporting informal seed systems (but the 
Ministry’s staff assists farmers in selecting seed of 
improved legumes and maize composites where certified 
seed is unavailable9). In the draft Seed Policy (Republic 
of Kenya 2008b), the government declares that it will 
support the informal seed sector, but also contends that 
this support is aimed at ‘transforming it to the formal 
sector’. Contrary to the limited support for the informal 
sector, there are many initiatives by the government 
supporting the formal sector, such as developing policies 
to guide the sector and training various actors in the 
seed industry by extension staff and KEPHIS. This biased 
support for formal sector inherently gives high rainfall 
areas a greater advantage over dry areas in food produc-
tion, given the centrality of seed in agriculture.
In summary, none of the seed systems in the country 
can effectively and sustainably deliver all seeds that meet 
the demands of all farmers, since the preferences and 
socio-cultural and ecological conditions of farmers are 
too diverse. The Green Revolution concept is anchored 
on improved varieties, which are delivered to farmers 
mainly through private sector-led formal seed systems. 
However, the above literature has clearly demonstrated 
that the profit-driven private formal seed sector in the 
country serves mainly the maize sub-sector, high rainfall 
areas and better resource-endowed farmers and there-
fore inherently locks out some categories of farmers. If 
the country is to achieve a Green Revolution for most, if 
not all farmers, there is need for government to review 
its policies and allow for development of both systems 
or interfacing of the two systems.
3.2. Actors and actor networks
Before liberalisation of the seed industry, the seed sector 
in Kenya was dominated by public actors who controlled 
industry, policy and regulation, variety development, 
and seed production and distribution, in an intricate 
monopolistic arrangement. However, since liberalisation, 
significant reorganisation has occurred in the industry, 
bringing in more players and redefining the mandates 
of existing ones. This section highlights the main actors 
and their roles and relations. 10  The configurations of 
actor network especially in influencing agro-dealer 
agenda is also reviewed in this section but contextualised 
and elaborated in section 5.
Ministry of Agriculture 
The main responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA) is development and coordination of policy and 
strategies for the industry, and therefore its role is to 
create the right environment for smooth operation of 
the industry. The MOA facilitates research, provides advi-
sory and information services, reviews policy and regula-
tory framework and facilitates partnerships among 
industry players. It regulates the seed industry mainly 
through the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services 
(KEPHIS)11. KEPHIS collaborates with District Agricultural 
Committees (DACs) to regulate agro-dealerships12. 
The thrust of government’s policy on seeds and other 
farm inputs, as contained in the Strategy for Revitalising 
Agriculture (SRA), is to improve quality, accessibility and 
affordability of the inputs. This is expected to  be achieved 
through strengthening of quality control institutions; 
training input suppliers on quality maintenance; 
strengthening of public input supply organisations such 
as KFA and Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC); 
expanding the capacity of national agricultural research 
system to produce adequate quantities of breeder seeds; 
promoting private sector investment in input business; 
building stockists’ (agro-dealers’) capacity to increase 
input supply and provide information and marketing 
services; building capacity of farmers’ organisations to 
procure inputs in bulk and resell to members; reviewing 
tax system to eliminate tax on agricultural inputs; and 
facilitating access to agricultural credit by reviewing 
credit and financial regulations. 
Although the MOA envisages a seed (input) industry 
that is largely market-driven, it does not seem prepared 
to completely surrender input supply to market forces, 
as implied by the intended revival of public input supply 
organisations mentioned above. Moreover, it directly 
participates in the inputs market by supporting 
programmes that distribute (subsidized) seeds and 
fertilisers to smallholder farmers who are unable to access 
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them due to poverty or natural disasters such as droughts, 
floods and civil conflicts. While some of these programmes 
involve agro-dealer participation and support, others 
bypass the agro-dealers13 and are deemed by some actors 
in the industry as interfering negatively with the market 
and creating confusion (Nyoro and Ariga 2004). 
On the other hand, according to MOA officials, the 
government feels it has a social responsibility to its citi-
zens, which warrants direct intervention in inputs market 
where the private sector is incapable or unwilling to 
improve access to inputs, particularly following disasters 
or among the vulnerable groups. But some analysts also 
see pursuit of political stability as the other underlying 
interest motivating government involvement in inputs 
markets (COMESA 2009). While these interests imply that 
the government may take a much longer time to relin-
quish input supply function to the private sector (if this 
will ever happen), it also raises an important question 
as to whether agro-dealers can be relied on to spur a 
Green Revolution among the poorest smallholder 
farmers and in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL).
Research Institutions
The public research is the mandate of the Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) a semi-autonomous 
body under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). KARI with 
its regional Agricultural Research Centres (ARCs) repre-
sents the main agency responsible for the coordination 
of agricultural research in the country. Its functions 
include plant breeding, production of breeder/founda-
tion seed, and its supply to basic seed producers. 
Kenya has had a long history of research on cereal 
crops such as maize, wheat and barley since early 1960s. 
In 1970s and 1980s, there was a proliferation of interna-
tional research organizations in the country. Kenya has 
the highest concentration of international agricultural 
research centres in Africa (IARCs). Following the collapse 
of the East African Community in 1977, the government 
established the National Council of Science and 
Technology (NCST) to co-ordinate activities of the 
National Agricultural Research Institutes (NARIs). The 
NARIs comprised mainly of two formal categories; the 
public and the private sectors and a small third group 
referred to as civil society. Many of NARIs in Africa fell 
under the influence of the public research sector with 
the CGIAR system playing an important role in setting 
the research agenda of Green Revolution (GR). 
The international actors in cereal crops research 
include the International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center (CIMMYT), which is mainly on maize research and 
the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) whose mandate cereal crops are 
sorghum and millets --work very closely with KARI in 
variety development. One of research projects imple-
mented by CIMMYT in partnership with KARI and other 
actors entails active participation of agro-dealers (see 
section 3).
Regionally, the research institutions are affiliated to 
the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research 
in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA)14. ASARECA is 
further affiliated to the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), where it a lead partner in 
Pillar 4 of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Program (CAADP) 15, implemented by 
COMESA on behalf of the African Union’s New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (AU/NEPAD) (COMESA 
Programmes 2009a; 2009b). ASARECA is supported by 
a number of donors, including USAID (the coordinator), 
World Bank, DFID (UK), the European Union, CIDA and 
IDRC (Canada), the African Development Bank, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
and SIDA (Sweden) (USAID East Africa 2009). Through 
the support of its partners, ASARECA has been spear-
heading seed policy development and harmonisation 
in member countries, to facilitate regional access to 
improved varieties. Another regional organisation is the 
African Agriculture Technology Foundation (AATF). AATF 
is a Nairobi-based not-for-profit organisation ‘established 
to facilitate and promote public/private partnerships for 
the access and delivery of appropriate proprietary agri-
cultural technologies for use by resource-poor small-
holder farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (SSA) (AATF 2009: 
para. 1).
This brief discussion on the configuration of agricul-
tural research institutions does not capture who are the 
big players and their influence in the Kenyan NARS. 
However a closer look at the actor-networks maps (see, 
for example, in Appendices 3 and 4), the relationship 
between KARI and the CGIAR centres is not all plain sailing 
and seamless cooperation. Instead, there are conflicts 
and politics at play.  One area of conflict is on research 
focus. KARI and sub-regional research organizations 
(SROs) such as ASARECA and AATF have increasingly 
developed research strategies, which focus on market/
economic growth whereas the IARCs have often focused 
on poverty eradication. While appreciating the good 
intentions for IARCs developing a research strategy with 
such broad objectives, KARI and SRO leaders nevertheless 
tend to feel that this may not be realistic --and they would 
prefer research systems to develop a strategy for more 
focused objectives. Closely related to this conflict is the 
view that most problems of African agriculture cover the 
entire supply chain: from production to post-production 
processing and marketing to weaknesses and inadequa-
cies in support institutions and infrastructure. This may 
not require the type of production- and factor-oriented 
research currently being undertaken in the IARCs. 
There is also politics at play towards sub-regional 
research organizations (SROs) such as ASARECA and AATF. 
In particular, financing of these research organizations 
is currently done by donors (see above the number of 
donors funding ASARECA)  and there is little contribution 
from the member countries. This raises the questions of 
long term sustainability of these organizations. Another 
challenge relates to partnerships between IARCs and the 
NARS. For instance, it is not uncommon for each IARC 
(and sometimes each programme in an IARC] to establish 
a partnership with KARI. This increases the number of 
partnerships with KARI scientists, the majority who then 
end up spending more time servicing the IARC 
programmes. Even within these organizations there are 
different interests played out, say over what is the 
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appropriate technological trajectory of the Green 
Revolution and priorities in strategic and non-strategic 
research themes and collaborations.
Seed Companies
The primary role of seed companies is seed production 
and marketing, but a few also undertake research. 
Currently, there are about 73 registered seed companies 
in the country, but only a few are involved in cereal seeds. 
For instance, only 11 seed companies had registered at 
least one cereal crop variety in the country by 2009, as 
shown in Figure 3. About two thirds of the cereal varieties 
in Kenya are registered under KARI and the Kenya Seed 
Company (KSC), both of which are public organisations. 
Western Seed Company (WSC) is the only local private 
company with significant presence in the cereal seed 
market, having registered 13 percent of the total cereal 
varieties. There are four main foreign-based private seed 
companies, Pannar, AgriSeed, Monsanto and Pioneer, 
which contribute a total of 17 percent of registered cereal 
varieties in Kenya. 
There is a significant organisation of seed companies 
at both national and regional levels: locally, they are 
members of Seed Trade Association of Kenya, STAK 
(which consists of about 50 percent of the registered 
seed companies); while regionally they are affiliated to 
African Seed Trade Association, AFSTA16. With the support 
of donors such as the Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA) – through the Business Advocacy Fund 
(BAF), STAK has been both vocal and influential in shaping 
seed policy in the country. For instance, STAK was instru-
mental in pressurising the government to form the Seeds 
and Plants Tribunal, to address seed trade disputes, which 
was done in 2006 and enact the Seeds and Plant Varieties 
(National Performance Trials) Regulations 2009 and the 
Seeds and Plant Varieties (Seeds) Regulations 2009.
Seed companies participate in seed trade by 
performing either of the following activities: production, 
processing and marketing; importation, repackaging and 
marketing; or importing and marketing seed. Companies 
which produce seed in the country contract registered 
seed growers to produce the seed following the proce-
dures and standards prescribed in the Seed and Plant 
Varieties Act (CAP 326). All seed companies have networks 
of stockists (agro-dealers) through which they distribute 
seed to farmers. However, some private seed companies 
interviewed felt that the playing field is tilted in favour 
of KSC for numerous reasons. 
First, the close association of KSC with the public 
research (KARI) and industry regulator (KEPHIS), which 
is itself a ‘historical accident’, gives KSC unfair advantage 
and influence policy circles. For instance, the Seeds and 
Plant Varieties (Seeds) Regulations, 2009 gives KSC 
express representation in the Seed Regulation Committee 
(Regulation 5) and Seed Allocation Panel Committee or 
Seed Growers Allocation Panel (Regulation 6). These are 
powerful committees that are mandated to develop seed 
policy; modify certification standards; recommend regis-
tration or de-registration of seed merchants; moderate 
appeals; regulate seed certification fees; and select 
eligible applicants for growing seed crops for compulsory 
certification. Representation of other seed companies 
in these committees hangs in the balance: Regulations 
5(2) and 6(2) only give each Committee the discretion 
to co-opt at most three other members to “represent 
such interests as it may time to time determine”; which 
means all other seed companies may only have up to 
three representatives. 
Figure 3. Companies with registered cereal varieties in Kenya
Source: Adapted from KEPHIS (2009)
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Secondly, KSC controls the seed market, supplying 
about 75 percent of all formal seed used in Kenya (STAK 
2007). Further, KSC largely controls the seed distribution 
channel – especially the large agro-dealers from whom 
smaller agro-dealers purchase their seed stocks. This 
makes it hard for new companies to penetrate the market. 
Thirdly, KSC is the preferred source of seed for govern-
ment-supported relief seed programmes which make 
huge purchases, and this is seen by competitors as unfair 
favouritism, as it promotes the business of one market 
player. 
In addition to concerns about preferential treatment 
of KSC by the government, the seed companies also feel 
that the government should not be involved in direct 
distribution of subsidised inputs. They argue that in such 
programmes, this function ought to be performed by 
agro-dealers, in order to build their capacity and sustain-
ability of input supply (COMESA 2009). However, the 
underlying motivation of the private sector argument is 
protection of their business interests. For instance, CNFA/
AGMARK revealed that the newly formed Kenya National 
Agro-dealer Association (KENADA) will be lobbying the 
government to stop direct distribution of seed to farmers, 
because agro-dealers perceive this government act as 
injurious to their business.
The seed industry in Kenya has been regarded as one 
of the most developed in the region. However, it appears 
engaging in seed business may not be so easy after all , 
as there are some  barriers that limit the ability of new 
actors to compete on a level playing field with established 
players.. The policy and business environment favours 
one player over others, the Kenya Seed Company (KSC), 
and the sector is constrained by significant government 
interference. This state of affairs seems to contradict the 
government’s intention to promote private sector invest-
ment in the seed industry as stipulated in the SRA. There 
is therefore need to review the industry policies in order 
to entrench fairness in the industry.
Do n o r  Ag e n c i e s  a n d  No n - G ove rn m e nt a l 
Organisations 
Donor agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) are involved in key areas of the seed value chain. 
They mainly finance and support seed research and 
development, production, promotion and distribution. 
Activities of donors and NGOs are in both the formal and 
informal sector. Previous interventions by NGOs and 
donors have focused more on seed variety development 
and adoption, involving farming communities in seed 
production, and seed aid. 
Activities of donors and NGOs in the seed sector began 
in earnest in the 1990s following liberalisation of the 
seed (and fertiliser) industry. In the greater western part 
of the country (Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza Provinces) 
and some parts of the greater central Kenya, donor and 
NGO activities emphasize on market oriented (agribusi-
ness) models of seed (mostly of maize) and fertiliser 
distribution. For instance, from 1995, an NGO known as 
Sustainable Community-Oriented Development 
Programme (SCODP) began implementing activities 
aimed at encouraging farmers to increase their use of 
fertiliser in Western Kenya, with support from Rockefeller 
Foundation, USAID and German Agro-Action GAA 
(Wanzala et al. 2000). This project was informed by the 
narrative that ‘farmers were unable or unwilling (or both), 
to invest in a whole 50kg bag’ (Blackie and Albright 2005). 
SCODP’s activities thus included breaking the large (50kg) 
fertiliser packs and selling to farmers in smaller packs of 
up to or less than 1kg; experimentation with ‘minipacks’; 
and training of fertiliser stockists on business manage-
ment and technical aspects of fertilisers. 
Later, the SCODP model was expanded to cover other 
areas and technologies such as improved seed of maize 
and legumes, and herbicides. The narrative used was that 
‘with no weeding, even with heavy use of fertilizer, yields 
are negligible’, and this was coupled with some body of 
knowledge positing that ‘more frequently, weeding 
improves fertilizer use efficiency’; yet labour for this 
critical activity was constraining (Blackie and Albright 
2005). Following these narratives, FIPS Africa, an NGO, 
was formed in 2003, to oversee the implementation of 
the expanded input promotion and supply programme, 
with financial support from DFID, USAID and the 
Rockefeller Foundation (Blackie and Albright 2005). FIPS 
Africa works with a number of private sector players such 
as seed companies (Monsanto, KSC and WSC) which 
provide free seed for promotions; a fertiliser company 
(Athi River Mining – ARM) which produces a blended 
fertiliser; and agro-chemical companies (Monsanto and 
Lachlan Agriculture – a Kenyan Agent for Dow Chemicals) 
to supply herbicide and Larger Grain Borer pesticide 
respectively. 
In the greater eastern Kenya and other low rainfall 
areas (commonly known as Arid and Semi-Arid Lands 
– ASAL), most donor and NGO seed activities focus on 
seed aid and informal seed systems. These areas are 
targeted for intervention because they are believed to 
be ecologically and economically marginalized, prone 
to natural disasters and inadequately served by both the 
formal and informal seed systems (Omanga and Rossiter 
2004). Seed aid in the ASAL, a collaborative effort 
between NGOs/donor agencies and the government, 
began in the country in 1992 as an emergency measure 
following severe droughts, and has since become almost 
an annual activity in these areas (Omanga and Rossiter 
2004). Initial seed aid activities of the 1990s took the 
form of conventional seed procurement and distribution 
(CSPD). The rationale behind CSPD was that seed was 
unavailable in the disaster-affected areas. Following this 
assumption, the seed aid implementing agencies would 
contract registered seed companies to procure and 
deliver seed at the targeted areas. Seed would then be 
distributed directly to farmers through the implementing 
NGO,  in  col laborat ion with  the provincia l 
administration. 
However, following the numerous challenges of imple-
menting the CSPD and insights from  several seed system 
studies, a new approach called the Seed Vouchers and 
Fairs (SVF) was introduced in the country by the Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS), with funding from the FAO and 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
– SIDA, in 2000 (Remington et al. 2002). Contrary to the 
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CSPD, the SVF was founded on the belief that seed is 
always available in a region, even after disasters – the 
problem is lack of accessibility by farmers. Based on this 
SVF system premise, the implementing agency issues 
needy farmers with coupons of a pre-determined value, 
which they exchange for seed of preferred crops and 
varieties at local seed stockists (for formal seed) or 
informal seed vendors (for informal seed). The seed 
vendors then redeem the vouchers for cash from the 
implementing agency. Therefore, in addition to providing 
farmers with more and diversified seeds than the CSPD, 
the underlying motivation for the SFV is business: the 
system supports seed market development. However, 
sustainability of the markets without donor support is 
not guaranteed, given that the SVF itself is a funded 
activity. This approach has also been recently adopted 
by the government to increase access to seed of improved 
maize varieties and fertilisers by resource-poor farmers 
in high rainfall areas, under the NAAIAP. 
Other seed activities funded by NGOs/donor agencies 
in the ASAL are community seed programs, which entail 
seed bulking as a key activity. The programs mainly target 
cereals including maize, sorghum and millet OPVs (open 
pollinated varieties) and grain legumes such as beans, 
pigeonpeas, cowpeas, green grams (mung bean) and 
dolichos. A study by Muhammad et al. (2003) reports 
that under these programs, the implementing agencies 
source improved crop varieties mainly from the KARI seed 
unit (KSU)17 and distribute them to farmers for grain 
production and seed bulking. At the end of the season, 
each beneficiary farmer is supposed to return to the 
implementing agency part of the grain produced, as seed 
(this is usually twice the amount of seed received by the 
beneficiary). The ‘seed’ recovered from these farmers is 
distributed to other farmers in subsequent seasons. It is 
also expected that through farmer to farmer seed 
exchange networks, the improved varieties would diffuse 
to other farmers not covered by the programmes. 
NGOs that have implemented such programmes 
include World Vision, Action Aid, the African Medical 
Research Foundation (AMREF), CARE Kenya, CRS and 
Adventist Relief Agricultural programme (ADRA), working 
in collaboration with KARI, University of Nairobi, CIMMYT 
and ICRISAT. Key donor agencies that have funded the 
programmes include the USAID, FAO and IFAD. It is impor-
tant, however, to note that the support of donors is not 
limited to NGOs: they also fund community seed bulking 
activities implemented by the MOA, which are embedded 
in its food security programmes such as the Traditional 
(Orphan) Food Crops Programme in Eastern province, 
and Njaa Marufuku Kenya (kick hunger out of Kenya).
With the recent calls for a Green Revolution in Africa, 
focus of donor agencies and NGOs is increasingly 
diffusing into seed market development, with significant 
support going towards establishment of seed distribu-
tion (agro-dealer) networks in Kenya. These programs 
generally entail financial support for establishing agro-
dealers, training agro-dealers in business and technical 
aspects of agro-dealership, linking agro-dealers to busi-
ness financial services and mobilizing agro-dealers to 
form business associations. Most notable among these 
is the Agro-dealer Development Programme (ADP) 
funded by AGRA, which is expanded on in section 5. 
It is clear that philanthropic organisations have signifi-
cantly contributed in shaping the seed industry in general 
and agro-dealership in particular, in the last two decades. 
While activities of these organisations have reportedly 
resulted in increased uptake of improved seeds, fertilisers, 
and other complementary technologies, and in some 
cases increased yields, some critics have expressed 
doubts about the stated results. They view these activities 
as a ‘Trojan horse’ for genetically modified (GM) seeds 
(Waithaka 2008) or simply a strategy to ‘roll out a gene 
revolution’ in Africa (Mayet 2009). There is speculation 
that behind the apparently charitable Green Revolution 
programmes are profit-driven transnational corporations 
(TNCs) including Syngenta Crop Protection, Monsanto, 
Dow AgroSciences, Bayer CropScience and Du Pont Crop 
Protection, battling for the control of a lucrative seed 
market in African countries. Hence, the ‘charitable’ initia-
tives are seen as a tool for breaking Africa’s resistance to 
GM seeds and foods, and prying open a market for 
chemical fertilisers. The underlying concern is that GM 
seeds, fertilisers and other agro-chemicals are potentially 
Water-Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA) is a public-private partnership research initiative that is funded by Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) (AATF 2010). The programme entails use of transgenic materials donated, royalty-
free from the Monsanto company, for introduction into local materials.  African Agricultural Technology Foundation 
(AATF) plays the key role of technology broker, negotiating and mediating the relationships between the BMGF, 
Monsanto and public breeding institutions such as CIMMYT and KARI. Through its stewardship programme, AATF also 
influences the creation of ‘enabling’ environment such IPRs and Biosafety regulations that facilitate the field testing and 
release of the varieties once they are developed. 
According to Brooks et al. (2009: 29-30) 
“…AATF representatives see their flagship ‘Strigaway’ project as providing the template for the future ‘deployment’ 
of the outputs of the WEMA research. In particular they envisage a key role for private agro-dealers in disseminating 
the technologies and related advice. However, while useful lessons may be learned from the technology-driven 
introduction of Strigaway technology (a chemical seed coating developed to protect the plant against Striga, or 
witch weed), these may have limited relevance to a transgenic product several years away from deployment, and 
for which the development of institutional arrangements are still at a very early stage.  Given these complexities, it 
is questionable whether agro-dealers could substitute for an appropriately trained, agricultural extension service in 
guiding farmers through a maze of decisions regarding the adoption of the new technologies and their integration 
into diverse farming systems.”
Box 1. Role of agro-dealers in deploying WEMA project
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harmful to African indigenous seed populations, bio-
diversity and the environment. It is also feared that such 
activities could make smallholder farmers dependent 
on these costly inputs from TNCs, which will ‘deepen the 
power imbalances between smallholder farmers and 
TNCs, represented by the “local” agro-dealers and 
regional wholesalers’ (Moyo et al. 2009: 15). In Kenya, 
AATF was using agro-dealers in the delivery of Strigaway 
maize project as a template for the future deployment 
of WEMA research (Box 1).
Farmers and their organisations  
Farmers and their organisations play several important 
roles in Kenya’s seed systems. For instance, they partici-
pate in research and development of new varieties, 
mainly through on-farm trials conducted by research 
organisations. In addition, they act as centres of informa-
tion dissemination to other farmers regarding new 
improved varieties coming through research. This is 
accomplished by way of hosting demonstrations and 
field days in which the varieties are promoted18. Farmers 
(particularly in low rainfall areas) are also involved, indi-
vidually or as groups, in seed production and distribution, 
mainly through informal systems, under community seed 
projects supported by NGOs, research organisations and 
the MOA (Muhammad et al. 2003).  Recently, however, 
small farmer organisations have slowly started venturing 
into formal agro-dealership. For instance, some farmer 
groups in high rainfall areas are running farm input shops 
(agro-dealers) which they have been trained and facili-
tated to establish through programmes such as the Kenya 
Maize Development Programme (KMDP).  
There is an umbrella association for Kenyan farmers 
called the Kenya National Federation of Agricultural 
Producers (KENFAP), with a membership of 1.43 million 
farmers, drawn from farmer groups, commodity organisa-
tions and cooperative societies. KENFAP has lately been 
lobbying for farmers’ interests in Kenya’s seed policy. It 
has recently also been incorporated as a member of the 
powerful Seed Regulation Committee, which is charged 
with among other responsibilities, development of seed 
policy (See Regulation 5(1) of the Seed and Plant Varieties 
(Seeds) Regulations, 2009). In addition, KENFAP is slowly 
venturing into agro-dealership – it has established 12 
Small Inputs Shops (located mainly in high rainfall areas 
of Central, Rift Valley and Western Kenya) which stock 
and sell maize seed and fertilisers (procured in bulk 
through the organisation) to members as well as non-
members. KENFAP has been using these ‘agro-dealers’ 
to distribute maize seed and fertiliser to farmers under 
the National Accelerated Agricultural Inputs Access 
Programme (NAAIAP).
The government, in the SRA intends to support farmer 
groups to venture into agro-dealership, as a measure to 
increase farmers’ access to quality farm inputs. In this 
regard, the policy target is to have ‘farmer organisations 
carrying out inputs and financial supply operations and 
rated successful’, and ‘at least 2 farmer apex bodies 
importing inputs for their members within two years’ of 
the policy implementation (Republic of Kenya 2004). 
These measures, if successfully implemented have the 
potential of introducing competition in input procure-
ment and distribution, hence reducing input costs for 
farmers. But few crops have strong national associations 
which can translate this potential into tangible benefits 
for smallholder cereal farmers.
This section has shown that the seed system in Kenya 
is highly complex. In the liberalised system, there are a 
wide range of interactions. While the state is key in 
providing core support for breeding as well as a regula-
tory function, the formal seed system is dominated by 
market interactions. Through their association, STAK, the 
seed traders are influenced by a few major companies, 
including Western Seed, Pannar, AgriSeed, Monsanto and 
Pioneer, and a parastatal, the Kenya Seed Company (KSC). 
The companies are reliant on a large network of agro-
dealers who distribute and sell seed to farmers. These 
players are a key link in the chain, and central to broader 
vision of a private-sector led Green Revolution, supported, 
coordinated and regulated by the state. In the next 
section, we present the results of our agro-dealer survey, 
which puts the Kenyan agro-dealer into a practical 
perspective, in terms of their main features, how they 
operate and the operational challenges that limit their 
effectiveness in delivering a Green Revolution.
4. Agro-dealers in Kenya’s 
Cereal Seed Systems 
4.1. Who is an Agro-dealer? 
Defining a Kenyan agro-dealer in practice is quite chal-
lenging, yet a good understanding of who an agro-dealer 
is in local situations and contexts can help in designing 
better programmes that improve agro-dealer effective-
ness and efficiency in input delivery to farmers. According 
to AGRA (2009a), ‘agro-dealers’ are ‘small farm retailers’ 
or ‘trained and certified stockists’, through whom farm 
inputs such as seeds and soil nutrients, and knowledge 
about their safe and efficient use are channelled to small-
holder farmers. In Kenyan farming communities, agro-
dealers are defined as ‘traders in agricultural inputs’ 
(which may include improved seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, 
animal feeds, veterinary drugs and simple farm tools). 
Other common names given to agro-dealers are ‘stockists’ 
and ‘agro-vets’19.
Seed dealership is anchored in the Seeds and Plant 
Varieties (Seeds) Regulations, 2009. However, there does 
not seem to be a specific legal definition of an agro-dealer 
in Kenya. Persons involved in seed trade have been recog-
nized under different ‘titles’ depending on the piece of 
legislation. The Seed and Plant Varieties Act (Cap 326) 
interchangeably refers to seed traders as ‘persons who 
deal in seeds’20 or ‘sellers of seeds’21; and further defines 
seed selling as bartering, exchanging, and offering or 
exposing for sale22. On the other hand, the Seeds and 
Plant Varieties (Seeds) Regulations, 2009 categorize seed 
handlers into seed merchants, seed growers and seed 
sellers, with seed sellers being further categorised into 
agents, sub-agents and stockists. According to Regulation 
2 of the Seeds and Plant Varieties (Seeds) Regulations, 
2009, a registered seed merchant means ‘a person or firm 
or institution officially recognized by the Seed Committee 
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as suitable to procure, process or sell seed’. The Regulations 
further define a licensed seed seller as ‘any person or 
institution licensed to sell Government tested and certi-
fied seeds only’. 
Seed sellers ought to be appointed by seed merchants 
and possess ‘knowledge, ability and appropriate facilities 
to maintain the quality and viability of the seed offered 
for sale’23. The procedure for registering as a seed seller 
can be paraphrased as follows. Each year, seed companies 
present lists of traders aspiring to become their stockists 
(who should also have completed an application form 
for seed sellers’ licence) to KEPHIS. KEPHIS then presents 
the lists to DACs, which discuss the applicants’ character 
and suitability for the business and provide to KEPHIS a 
list of approved applicants. Thereafter, KEPHIS inspects 
proposed seed stores of the DAC-approved applicants 
and issues licences to applicants whose stores are in 
satisfactory condition24. (Application fees for registration 
as a seed stockist are Ksh 1,000; while annual licences 
fees are Ksh 50025). 
This registration procedure, however, seems to contra-
dict the tenets of the liberalized environment in which 
agro-dealership currently operates. The requirement that 
an applicant for Seed Sellers’ Licence be nominated by 
a particular seed company appears superfluous given 
that once licensed, the seed seller can trade in seeds of 
any company. 
4.2. Characteristics of Agro-dealers 
Survey results indicate that about 70 percent of agro-
dealers in Machakos and Uasin Gishu are owned by men. 
The mean age of interviewed agro-dealer owners was 
39 years, but agro-dealer owners in Uasin Gishu were 
much older (43 years) on average, compared to those in 
Machakos (35 years). Most agro-dealer owners are fairly 
well educated, with 58 percent having a college or univer-
sity education. However, only 13 percent have post-
secondary school training in an agricultural field. About 
20 percent have trained in a pharmaceutical field and 
16 percent in an animal health field. Agro-dealer owners 
in Machakos have a higher level of formal education than 
their counterparts in Uasin Gishu, with 71 percent having 
a college/university education compared to Uasin Gishu’s 
42 percent. These results are consistent with those of an 
earlier study by Muhammad et al. (2003) which found 
seed traders in Eastern Kenya to be mostly male (77 
percent), aged about 37 years, well educated (average 
of 13 years of formal education – which is college level) 
and some having training in medical (17 percent) and 
animal health fields (26 percent).
It is worth noting that not all agro-dealer owners are 
involved in managing their inputs businesses. Survey 
results show that 44 percent of them managed their 
businesses on full-time basis26, while 46 percent did so 
on a part-time basis, and a further 10 percent did not 
participate in managing the businesses at all. Most agro-
dealer owners who did not manage their businesses on 
a full-time basis had their businesses run by employees. 
About 67 percent of agro-dealers employed regular 
workers. The workers were aged 27 years on average and 
only 40 percent of them had post- secondary education, 
majority having specialized in pharmaceutical/medical 
studies and a few in business studies. Overall, about one 
third of regular workers had received training on some 
aspects of agro-dealership conducted by agro-chemical 
and seed companies, KEPHIS, MOA extension staff and 
some NGOs. However, a regional disparity existed, with 
about 41 percent of workers in Uasin Gishu and only 25 
percent in Machakos having received such training27. 
These results imply that although owners of agro-
dealers may have high levels of training, their skills may 
not maximally benefit customers (farmers) since less than 
a half of them are involved in day-to-day management 
of their businesses, and are therefore unavailable to field 
technical queries from customers. This raises an impor-
tant question regarding who should be targeted by the 
trainings that have now become popular in agro-dealer 
capacity building programmes by both public and phil-
anthropic organisations—aimed at making agro-dealer 
shops as hubs of new technologies and information. 
Should such trainings target the business owners, most 
of who are not in regular contact with the customers, or 
Figure 5. Age distribution of agro-dealer business by 
region
Source: Computed from agro-dealer survey data (2009)
Figure 4. Age distribution of agro-dealer business
Source: Computed from agro-dealer survey data (2009)
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the employees who run the businesses on daily basis? 
Further, when we refer to an agro-dealer as ‘accredited’, 
who has been trained – is it the person doing the actual 
selling of seeds and associated inputs, and providing 
technical information to the farmers on a daily basis?
Most agro-dealer businesses in the study areas are 
fairly young, with about 60 percent having been in opera-
tion for 5 years or less. This matches the findings of 
Muhammad et al. (2003), who reported the mean age 
of seed trading businesses in Eastern Kenya to be 5.5 
years. However, regional differences exist: more than half 
of the agro-dealers in Uasin Gishu have been in operation 
for over 5 years; compared to 30 percent in Machakos. 
This discrepancy has most likely been occasioned by long 
presence of seed companies (particularly KSC) in Uasin 
Gishu, compared to Machakos. Age distribution of inter-
viewed agro-dealers has been illustrated in Figures 4 and 
5.
Agro-dealers in Kenya stock a number of commodities. 
As illustrated in Figures 6, the main items stocked by 
sampled agro-dealers are seed, pesticides, fertilisers, 
veterinary drugs and animal feeds respectively. Others 
commodities include building materials, general 
merchandise28 (hereafter referred to as others) and 
human drugs. All agro-dealers had stocked seed in the 
year 2009, but it is only in Machakos where all agro-
dealers had stocked maize seed, compared to 88 percent 
in Uasin Gishu, as shown in Table 2 In both districts, most 
agro-dealers stocked seed of horticultural crops, but an 
insignificant number also stocked sorghum seed. In Uasin 
Gishu, a few of agro-dealers also stocked wheat, finger 
millet and legume seeds. This reinforces earlier argu-
ments that for the food producing sector, formal seed 
systems serve mainly the high rainfall areas and maize 
sub-sector. 
In terms of money investment, Figure 7 shows that 
commodities that are not direct agricultural inputs29 
constituted more than half of the value of stocks held 
by agro-dealers interviewed. Seeds and fertilisers consti-
tuted a paltry 18 percent of the stock value. A further 
decomposition of the value of agro-dealer stock by 
region as shown in Figure 8 shows that about 75 and 43 
percent of the stock in Machakos and Uasin Gishu respec-
tively consisted of direct agricultural inputs. This differ-
ential between the two regions can be largely explained 
by their agro-ecological differences In the Eastern 
Province, it was the beginning of the main rainy season 
and therefore agro-dealers in Machakos may have 
adjusted their stocks in anticipation of increased input 
demand. On the other hand, the main season in Rift Valley 
was coming to an end and therefore agro-dealers in Uasin 
Gishu may have divested from agricultural inputs into 
other commodities due to reduced demand for the 
inputs. 
Diversification of agro-dealer stocks in Kenya has also 
been reported in earlier fertiliser and seed marketing 
studies by Wanzala et al. (2001) and Muhammad et al. 
(2003). The studies show that fertiliser and seed retailers 
Table 2. Crop focus of agro-dealers by region
District
Percentage of Agro-dealers who Stock Seed of:
Maize Sorghum Wheat Millet Legumes Vegetables
Machakos 100 3 0 0 0 53
Uasin Gishu 80 12 12 4 36 80
Overall 91 7 5 2 16 65
Source: Computed from agro-dealer survey data (2009)
Figure 6. Commodity stocked by agro-dealers
Source: Computed from agro-dealer survey data (2009)
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diversify into other agricultural inputs and non-agricul-
tural items. Diversity of commodities stocked reflects a 
risk coping mechanism for business survival, given the 
seasonal and erratic demand for agricultural inputs (espe-
cially seed and fertilisers). For instance, agro-dealers in 
Machakos sell cereal seed and fertiliser mainly in 
September-October (short rains season) and marginally 
in February-March (long rains seasons), while their coun-
terparts in Uasin Gishu sell cereal seed and fertiliser 
mostly in January-June (long rains season). The traders 
hence have to stock other items whose demand is less 
prone to seasonal fluctuations, in order to keep their 
businesses afloat when seed and fertiliser business is 
off-season. Diversification also helps in spreading out 
business costs such as those associated with transport, 
handling and storage. 
The implication from the results presented in this 
section is that any initiatives aimed at supporting agro-
dealers should not focus only on seed and fertilisers, but 
the totality of the business   stock of other commodities 
i s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  c o m p l e m e n t i n g  r e v e n u e 
from commodities related to agriculture and keeping 
the agro-dealer in business until the onset of the next 
planting season.
Due to diversity of commodities stocked, agro-dealers 
in Kenya require many legal documents for a hassle-free 
operation30. Every formal business ought to be registered 
with local government authorities (town or municipal 
council) but further registration with other government 
agencies depends on specific commodities stocked by 
agro-dealers. Compliance with agro-dealership registra-
tion requirements exhibits a considerable regional 
discrepancy. Whereas registration with local authorities 
was more than 95 percent in both regions, the mandatory 
registration of seed stockists with KEPHIS stood at 88 
percent and 47 percent in Uasin Gishu and Machakos 
respectively. Further, only 67 percent of agro-dealers 
were registered with Pest Control Products Board (PCPB) 
in Machakos, compared to 92 percent in Uasin Gishu.
Regulation 18 (5) of the Seeds and Plant Varieties 
(Seeds) Regulations 2009 states that ‘No person shall sell 
seed unless he holds a valid licence issued under this 
Figure 7. Value of commodities stocked by agro-dealers (%)
Source: Computed from agro-dealer survey data (2009)
Figure 8. Value of commodities stocked by agro-dealers by region (%)
Source: Computed from agro-dealer survey data (2009)
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regulation’. Further, according to Regulation 22 (1) (e) 
‘Any person who contravenes any of the requirements 
of these Regulations, shall be guilty of an offence’. Based 
on these Regulations, it can be inferred from the survey 
data that that in reality, there are two types of sellers of 
certified seed in the country: ‘legal’ (licensed) seed sellers 
and ‘illegal’ (unlicensed) seed sellers. The fact that there 
is illegal agro-dealership in Kenya depicts a legal and 
re g u l ato r y  f ra m e wo r k  t h at  re s t r i c t s  e nt r y 
by entrepreneurs into formal agro-dealership. It also 
highlights the lack of institutional capacity among the 
regulatory agencies charged with enforcing the various 
agro-dealership laws, a position shared by KEPHIS31. 
Further, having more illegal agro-dealers in Machakos 
than in Uasin Gishu may be an indication that the regula-
tory agencies are more active or accessible in the high- 
rather than low rainfall- and marginal areas. It may also 
be argued that agro-dealers in Uasin Gishu, having been 
Many unlicensed agro-dealers in Machakos District said they had neither heard of KEPHIS nor known that it is manda-
tory to register seed business with such a body. Phrases like ‘what is KEPHIS?’, ‘what do they do?’, ‘I have never seen them’, 
‘I will register if they come around’ were common responses by unregistered seed sellers when asked to show seed 
sellers’ license from KEPHIS, or why they had not yet obtained the licence. The procedure of formalising most businesses 
in the region seemed to be one of ‘start-the-business-first,-do-the-formalities-later’ (registration in such cases happens 
when concerned authorities visit business premises during routine/impromptu inspection). Not only do many agro-
dealers in Machakos operate without seed sellers’ licences, but some also contravene other laws such as keeping the 
seed containers intact (seed the photograph below).
This unlicensed agro-dealer in Machakos District sells to a customer 
maize seed whose package she has tampered with contrary to the law 
(Condition 5 on the Seed Sellers’ Licence). The agro-dealer owner 
argued that some of her customers ask for 1kg of maize seed, yet most 
varieties are sold in 2kg packs. For such customers, she carefully breaks 
the package in the presence of the customer and removes 1kg of seed, 
which she packs in another container for the customer. The rest of the 
seed must remain in the original container for easy identification and 
acceptance by the next customer who demands 1kg of the same 
variety. This may be a wake-up call to seed companies to start availing 
maize seed in packs that are smaller than 2kg in Machakos (a few are 
already selling some seed in 1kg packs).
On the other hand, in Uasin Gishu, seed stockists take certification by 
KEPHIS seriously due to a number of reasons. First, strict procedures 
have to be followed before one can register as an agro-dealer. ‘The 
DAC vets them thoroughly before they are registered as seed stockists 
or renew their stockist’s license. In fact, the DAC is so strict on licensing 
of seed stockists that some years ago, it banned a certain agro-dealer 
from ever holding a seed seller’s license in the District, after he was 
caught with adulterated seed.’32  Secondly, Kenya Seed Company (KSC), 
the main supplier of cereal seed to agro-dealers, ensures that the stockists are certified by KEPHIS. An agro-dealer in 
Burnt Forest Market in Ainabkoi Division, John*, remarked during the survey interview that ‘KSC will not sell seed to you 
(as an agro-dealer) if you are not certified by KEPHIS’. In the same Market, a local research assistant asked Ms Mary*, an 
agro-dealer, to show the authors of this paper the ‘KSC license’, to 
which the KEPHIS license has become synonymous33 . Thirdly, many 
farmers are aware that seed stockists have to be certified by KEPHIS. 
David*, an agro-dealer in Jua-Kali Market in Turbo Division, reported 
that some maize seed customers demand proof of his KEPHIS 
certification before buying the seed from him.
A duly registered agro-dealer business in Burnt Forest, Uasin Gishu, 
displaying documents of formal registration and trainings. The 
agro-dealer, however, feels that some of the licences are unnecessary. 
He cites the licence he had to obtain from the Ministry of Public Health, 
yet he does not deal in food items. He suggests that the authorities 
should notify traders in advance before introducing new licences.
Box 1. Role of agro-dealers in deploying WEMA project
Table 3.  Agro-dealer start-up capital, stock value and asset ownership
District Star t-up Capital 
(Ksh)
Stock Value During Survey 
(Ksh)
% of Agro-dealers Owning 
Business Premises Motor Vehicle
Uasin Gishu 99,200 387,740 44 24
Machakos 95,625 124,437 17 23
Mean 97,355 234,147 29 24
Source: Computed from agro-dealer survey data (2009)
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in operation for a much longer time, had much more 
time to register their businesses. Box 2 compares the 
legal status of agro-dealership between low and high 
rainfall areas.
Table 3 illustrates capital requirement to start an agro-
dealer, the value agro-dealer stock and ownership of two 
assets critical for business recapitalisation – business 
premises and motor vehicle. The average capital to start 
agro-dealer business in both regions is about Ksh 
100,000. The most important source of this capital in 
Machakos is own savings, whereas in Uasin Gishu, most 
of the start up capital is from sale of agricultural produce, 
since most businessmen are also farmers. During the 
survey, an average agro-dealer had stock worth 
Ksh234,000. However, a regional disparity existed, with 
the value of stock of an Uasin Gishu agro-dealer averaging 
at Ksh388,000, while that of a similar business in Machakos 
averaged at Ksh124,000. The implication is that business 
growth is faster in Uasin Gishu than in Machakos. A study 
by Omamo and Mose (1999) found that revenues of 
fertiliser traders in areas with low agricultural potential 
were significantly lower than those of traders in higher 
potential areas, due to lower input demand in the low 
potential areas. This may explain, to a greater extent, the 
difference in business growth between the two study 
areas.
Majority of agro-dealers operate on rented shops as 
only a paltry 29 percent of study sample owned the busi-
ness premises they operated in. However, ownership of 
business premises was more in Uasin Gishu (44 percent) 
than in Machakos (17 percent). Ownership of motor 
vehicles and motorbikes by agro-dealers stood at 24 and 
11 percent respectively. This low level of ownership of 
significant business assets has implications on ability of 
agro-dealers to secure business loans since most lending 
institutions asked the agro-dealers for a vehicle logbook 
or proof of business premises ownership as collateral for 
loans34. It means that most small entrepreneurs are locked 
out of financial markets, limiting their potential for input 
business expansion, especially in the low rainfall areas. 
For instance, Omamo and Mose (1999) reported that 85 
percent of fertiliser traders who received credit in 1997 
were from high potential areas. In light of these revela-
tions, interventions aimed at increasing agro-dealers’ 
access to credit should pay more attention to the small-
scale and young agro-dealers and low rainfall areas, in 
order to increase agro-dealer density. 
To sum up, these characteristics show the heteroge-
neity of agro-dealers and their operating environment. 
There are regional variations in terms of age, legal status, 
size and level of capitalisation of agro-dealer enterprises. 
Even within the same region, agro-dealers are differenti-
ated by individual characteristics such as owner-operated 
or manager-operated business, age, gender, level and 
type of education, etc. As discussed in the next section, 
these variations have implications in the social, ethnic, 
and geographical, positioning of agro-dealers, especially 
in their growth and delivery of agricultural and non-
agricultural commodities and services to farmers. 
4.3. Maize Seed Agro-dealership: Varieties 
and Sources
The previous section highlighted the nature of the agro-
dealer businesses and their social, ethnic, and geograph-
ical, positioning. This section moves on to what they 
Table 4. Number of maize seed varieties of each 
seed company stocked by agro-dealers in 2009
Seed Company Number of Varieties Stocked by 
Agro-dealers
Machakos Uasin Gishu Total
KSC 4 17 20
PANNAR 1 2 3
SEEDCO 2 0 2
PIONEER 1 0 1
MONSANTO 1 0 1
TOTAL 9 19 27
Source: Computed from agro-dealer survey data 
(2009)
Figure 9. Market penetration of maize seed companies in kenya
Source: Computed from agro-dealer survey data (2009)
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actually deliver. The narratives commonly used by 
government, donors and other Green Revolution advo-
cates promise that the agro-dealers will deliver the type 
of technologies that farmers  (including those in low and 
medium potential areas) want and need to transform 
agriculture. By focusing on maize, Kenya’s main cereal 
staple crop, this section examines what varieties and 
sources are stocked, and the variations that exist. 
Survey results indicate that a total of 27 varieties of 
maize seed were sold by interviewed agro-dealers in 2009 
(Table 4). Of these, 19 were traded in Uasin Gishu and 
only 9 in Machakos 35. This difference is not unusual, a 
recent study Kibaara et al. (2009a) reported that in 2007, 
32 maize varieties were planted by farmers in high poten-
tial maize zone, compared to 15 in Eastern Lowlands. 
Maize varieties traded by interviewed agro-dealers were 
from 5 companies: Kenya Seed Company (KSC), Seed 
Co., Pioneer Hi-bred, Monsanto and Pannar Seed 
Company. Interviewed agro-dealers in Machakos stocked 
seed from all the five companies but in Uasin Gishu, agro-
dealers had stocked seed of only 2 companies, namely 
KSC and Pannar. The average number of varieties stocked 
by an agro-dealer in Machakos was 4 while agro-dealers 
in Uasin Gishu stocked an average of 6 varieties. Overall, 
KSC varieties dominated the market, constituting about 
74 percent of the traded varieties. 
Figure 9 shows overall market penetration36 of various 
seed companies in the two regions of study, while Figure 
10 compares the companies’ market penetration in the 
two regions in 2009. From these illustrations, it can be 
noted that KSC again dominated the market, with 72 
percent of the interviewed agro-dealers having stocked 
at least one KSC variety. SeedCo, Pioneer, Monsanto and 
Pannar had their varieties stocked respectively by 52, 44, 
32 and 16 percent of interviewed agro-dealers. However, 
the market penetration of KSC was higher in Uasin Gishu 
than in Machakos while the other companies had higher 
market penetration in the latter than the former.  
A possible explanation for the dominance of multina-
tional seed companies in Machakos is that local seed 
companies have shown little or no interest in certified 
seed for dryland crops, citing low and erratic demand 
(FAO 2009). The local companies also lack germplasm 
adapted to low rainfall areas, since, as seen earlier, 
development of maize varieties by researchers in Kenya 
has for long been biased towards medium and high 
rainfall areas. Domination of market penetration by KSC 
in Uasin Gishu can be attributed to several factors 
including the long presence of the company in the region, 
which has endeared it to the farmers and agro-dealers 
and massive promotional campaigns by the company 
ahead of the planting season. KSC also has exclusive 
possession of germplasm suitable for high rainfall areas 
due to an earlier Memorandum of Understanding 
between KARI and KSC which excluded other companies 
from accessing varieties released through public 
breeding programmes for commercialisation (Nyoro and 
Ariga 2004). Unfair trade practices, such as media reports 
which accuse some foreign seed companies of dealing 
in genetically modified maize seeds, result in company 
disrepute and thus some farmers avoid their seeds37. 
Agro-dealers procured their maize seed stocks from 
two main sources: seed companies and large agro-
dealers. Whereas all interviewed agro-dealers in 
Machakos mainly sourced their seed from large agro-
dealers in Machakos town (the headquarters of Machakos 
District), 61 percent of agro-dealers in Uasin Gishu 
sourced their seed directly from the seed companies and 
39 percent from larger agro-dealers in Eldoret town (the 
headquarters of Uasin Gishu District). 
These differences in seed sources are a main cause of 
differentials in price stability between the two regions. 
Retail seed prices in Uasin Gishu ranged from Ksh 230 to 
250 per 2Kg pack of KSC varieties and 280-290 per 2Kg 
pack of multinational company varieties, while in 
Machakos the prices ranged from Ksh 250-300 per 2Kg 
pack of KSC varieties and Ksh 350-420 per 2Kg pack of 
multinational company varieties. In Uasin Gishu, seed 
prices are less variable across towns, since most of the 
agro-dealers source their seed from KSC and are given 
the recommended retail prices. Further, the farmers are 
also informed of retail prices by KSC ahead of the planting 
season through the local FM stations38. On the other hand, 
seed prices in Machakos are very erratic since the small 
agro-dealers buy from different larger agro-dealers, 
selling at different prices. The small agro-dealers add their 
transport costs and margins, making the seed prices to 
increase. In addition, farmers generally lack information 
Figure 10. Market penetration of maize seed companies in kenya by region
Source: Computed from agro-dealer survey data (2009)
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on retail prices and hence agro-dealers take advantage 
of the information asymmetry to charge exorbitant 
prices39. Consequentially, there is a need for seed compa-
nies operating in low rainfall areas to strengthen their 
network of agents and wholesalers in order to reduce 
distances travelled by smaller agro-dealers to obtain 
seeds. 
4.4. Challenges Facing Agro-dealership in 
Kenya 
Agro-dealers face several challenges in the course of their 
trade, and this limits their effectiveness in delivering 
inputs and information to producers and hence the GR 
in Kenya. The first is a seed industry-wide challenge occa-
sioned by weaknesses in the regulatory framework. For 
instance, the Seed and Plant Varieties Act (Cap 326) has 
not been reviewed since the industry was liberalised. It 
has, in the Draft Seed Policy, been faulted for insufficiently 
addressing seed certification and testing; regional 
harmonisation of seed laws, regulations and policies; and 
review of legal framework. This affects seed trade in 
general and consequently agro-dealership. Industry 
players (mostly seed companies and plant breeders, 
under the umbrellas of STAK and PBAK respectively) have 
been pressurising the government to review seed laws, 
and this has placed the Seed and Plant Varieties Act (Cap 
326) under review to address the aforementioned and 
other challenges. 
The second challenge is agro-dealers’ lack of working 
capital to adequately stock or expand their businesses. 
As a result, many agro-dealers are unable to meet farmers’ 
demand at peak of planting season. This supports obser-
vations by CNFA/AGMARK40 and study findings by 
Nambiro et al. (2001) that lack of capital was the most 
important barrier to entering hybrid maize seed retailing 
in Trans Nzoia, a high maize producing district in Kenya. 
Ayieko and Tcshirley (2006) posit that due to lack of 
capital, agro-dealers order less stock, which increases 
their operational costs and consequently input prices. 
This limitation was cited by agro-dealers and extension 
officers as the major challenge in implementation of a 
NAAIAP in both regions, as discussed later. 
The third challenge is high and erratic input prices, 
especially in Machakos. Muhammad et al. (2003) and 
Chianu et al. (2008) attributable this to high supply prices 
and transport and transaction costs, occasioned by long 
distances to input suppliers and poor infrastructure, 
especially roads. Due to the price behaviour, agro-dealers 
at the grassroots find it hard to convince farmers to buy 
seed from them. Many farmers opt to buy the small quan-
tities of seed they can afford and use non-certified seed 
to top up their seed demand. Consequently, movement 
of seed stock is slow and sales are low, limiting business 
profitability and growth. This, according to Chinau et al. 
(2008) constrains the development of an efficient 
agro-dealership.
The fourth challenge is the low and erratic nature of 
agricultural input demand occasioned by unpredictable 
weather patterns. This, according to agro-dealers, causes 
them to lose business opportunities when there is 
sudden upsurge of demand, and incur losses when inputs 
stocks reach their ‘sell by’ date (particularly agrochemi-
cals, which form an important component of agro-
dealers’ stock) due to slow movement occasioned by 
unexpected decline in demand. 
The fifth challenge is inadequate supply of inputs at 
the peak of planting season. Some agro-dealers inter-
viewed argued that when rains set in, there is very high 
demand for seed by farmers and many traders suddenly 
start to stock seed. This causes the larger suppliers to run 
out of stock, yet it takes some time before they can adjust 
their stocks to match the now high demand. 
Other (mild) challenges include government interfer-
ence with market by providing subsidized inputs (espe-
cially fertiliser) at the National Cereals and Produce Board 
(NCPB) – which sold at about US$5 less than agro-dealer 
prices; bad debts due to failure of some farmers to repay 
for inputs sold to them on credit; and lack of technical 
information about the seed varieties stocked. 
In summary, the mainstream GR narrative for Kenya 
sees agro-dealers at the centre of the action, and portrays 
them as the ideal small scale private sector solution to 
delivering new technologies for Kenya’s farmers. 
However, the survey of two districts – one more high 
potential and the other lower potential – shows some 
limitations of this simple narrative. These include:
 • the uneven geographical coverage with relatively 
fewer ‘legal’ and well capitalised agro-dealers in the 
poorer, lower potential areas; 
 • the focus of delivery on a limited number of seeds and 
varieties (mostly hybrid maize, adapted to medium 
and high rainfall areas);
 • the dominance of a few large companies in the supply 
chain, with knock on consequences for price competi-
tiveness and technology diversity;
 • the limited technical knowledge by those serving in 
agro-dealerships; 
 • the restrictive nature of regulations which limits wider 
competition in the local market; and
 • underdeveloped infrastructural support, which 
increases operating costs and consequently input 
prices, especially in the low rainfall areas.
Thus the universalising narrative of the role of agro-
dealers in the GR, presented by a strong and influential 
actor network at the centre of agricultural policy making 
and financing in Kenya can be qualified. The next section 
looks at a number of specific programmes which put 
agro-dealers on the centre stage, and examines whether 
these patterns described above are repeated in the 
design and implementation of publicly and philanthropi-
cally funded programmes aimed at delivering the Green 
Revolution in Kenya.
5. Driving the Agro-dealer 
Agenda in Cereal Seed 
Systems: Select Cases
5.1. Agro-dealers as the Hub of New Green 
Revolution 
The key players at the centre of the actor network 
promoting the new Green Revolution all see agro-dealers 
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as central to the delivery system. For instance, in Kenya’s 
Green Revolution policy document, the Strategy for 
Revitalising Agriculture (SRA), one of the government’s 
policy measures for  improving farmers’ access to inputs 
will be to ‘assist stockists [agro-dealers] to increase the 
capacity for inputs supply and the provision of informa-
tion ...to farmers’. The target was to have stockists 
providing input services in at least 80 percent of all small 
towns by 2007.  
Similar calls to develop agro-dealers have been made 
by various individuals and organisations. For instance, 
during the Africa Fertiliser Summit held in Nigeria from 
9-13 June 2006, former IFAD President, Lennart Båge 
called on various actors to expand agro-dealer networks. 
‘We [IFAD] see the emergence of a new rural private 
sector, with agro-dealers starting to provide farmers 
with inputs… Farmers’ physical access to fertilizers 
is improving, largely due to the growth of agro-
input dealer networks across rural Africa.  But this 
work has to be scaled up through collaboration 
between governments, fertilizer suppliers, NGOs, 
farmers’ organizations and international develop-
ment agencies’. (IFAD 2006)
In line with the call to scale up, the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has established the  Agro-
dealer Development Programme (ADP) which is being 
promoted in Kenya and some other African countries. 
AGRA assert that  ‘A strong agro-dealer system is crucial 
to farmers’ success because these local retailers serve as 
the primary conduits of farm inputs such as seeds and 
soil nutrients, and knowledge about their safe and effi-
cient use’ (AGRA 2009e: para. 2) 
Based on the above and other similar narratives, signifi-
cant investments have gone into building the agro-dealer 
network in Kenya, through a number of new programmes 
that have put agro-dealers at the centre of project design. 
This is seen as part of a broader public good commitment 
to a GR – part of a public private partnership. Thus about 
7.2 million US$has been committed by AGRA, for ADP 
activities in Kenya (AGRA 2009a). The activities include 
development of national agro-dealer networks and credit 
guarantees to improve access to agricultural inputs by 
agro-dealers and small-scale farmers. Further, the govern-
ment, through the MOA is implementing an inputs access 
programme, National Acceleration Agricultural Input 
Access Program (NAAIAP), at an estimated cost of Ksh 
16.7 billion (about US$220 million)41. The programme 
involves capacity building for agro-dealers and supply 
of subsidised inputs (improved maize seed and fertilisers) 
through agro-dealers. Another Ksh 1.5 million (about 
US$19,350) has been committed by the USAID and 
American Seed Trade Association (ASTA) through a 
consortium of research organisations, to implement the 
Maize Seed for the Poor project (MSP) aimed at deter-
mining the most cost-effective way to bring affordable 
inputs to the poor farmer. This amount covers the cost 
of subsidised inputs acquired by farmers from local agro-
dealers through a voucher system. The following sections 
examine in detail these three programmes, highlighting 
the rationale for inclusion of agro-dealers. 
5.2. Building Agro-dealer Networks: the 
Case of AGRA’s Agro-Dealer Development 
Program 
Background
Since 2006, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA) – a partnership between the Rockefeller and Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundations, has been championing 
agricultural development in Kenya, among other African 
countries. The main participation of the organisation in 
cereal seed systems is through its Programme for Africa’s 
Seeds Systems (PASS). The mission of PASS is to increase 
small-scale farmers’ income and reduce poverty through 
increasing the farmers’ yields. It is expected that more 
than 1,000 new varieties of at least 10 staple crops that 
increase the productivity of Africa’s small-scale farmers 
and contribute to the alleviation of the hunger and 
extreme poverty of 30 to 40 million people will be intro-
duced in 10 years, and participating small-scale farmers 
will be planting improved seeds on 20 to 30 percent of 
their cultivated lands. (Rockefeller Foundation 2009; 
AGRA 2009c; 2009e; 2009a)
PASS is implemented under four sub-programmes. 
Among these is the Agro-Dealer Development Program 
(ADP), which provides training, capital and credit to 
establish certified agro-dealers, who are a seen as a 
primary conduit of seeds, fertilisers, and knowledge to 
smallholder farmers to increase their productivity and 
incomes (Table 5). Funded to the tune of about US$7.2 
million, the program aims to build and develop networks 
of certified agro-dealers, to enhance quality, volume and 
range of seeds sold. The ADP is hoped to result in well-
functioning agro-dealers in order to support a significant 
increase in adoption of improved crop varieties. 
ADP activities build on earlier work started by the 
Rockefeller Foundation in 2001 under its programme 
titled ‘Developing rural agricultural input supply systems 
Table 5 Key AGRA-funded agro-dealer development projects in kenya
Organisation Project Purpose Budget (US$)
Citizens Network for 
Foreign Affairs, Inc
To develop national agro-dealer networks to improve access to agri-
cultural inputs by small-scale farmers.
4,473,851
Citizens Network for 
Foreign Affairs, Inc
To continue activities that develops the business and technical capacity 
of agro-dealers and regional wholesalers.
194,505 
Equity Bank Ltd For a guarantee fund to facilitate access to credit facilities by poor small-
holder farmers, agro-dealers and other players in the smallholder 
farming value chain in Kenya42.
2,500,000
Source: Compiled from AGRA (2009)
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for farmers in Africa’. The programme was informed by 
a narrative that traced low productivity of smallholder 
farmers in Africa to lack of access to affordable agricul-
tural inputs occasioned by poorly developed and weakly 
performing private sector input markets that assumed 
functions previously performed by the public sector, 
following economic liberalisation. The narrative under-
scored the need for a public-private partnership frame-
work in order to raise the awareness about improved 
technologies and inputs and create a high demand for 
the inputs; lower the transaction costs of supplying rural 
areas with agricultural inputs; improve the linkages 
between importers, wholesalers, and retailers; and 
improve the economies of scale in marketing of inputs 
at the wholesale and retail levels.
Based on this narrative, the programme’s activities 
were training of rural stockists on knowledge of fertilisers 
and seeds, book keeping, costing and pricing, managing 
business relations, sales and marketing, stock manage-
ment, and managing working capital. Once completed, 
these stockists became certified as ‘agro-dealers’. This 
was aimed at enabling the stockists to provide farmers 
with credible information on agricultural inputs use. The 
certified agro-dealers would then be linked to major 
agricultural input supply firms for credit arrangements; 
pack and sell seeds and fertilisers in small packages; form 
themselves into ‘purchasing groups’ and ‘agro-dealer 
associations’ which allow them to better negotiate for 
lower prices and better credit financing arrangements 
with the agricultural input supply companies, and influ-
ence government policies on imports, pricing, distribu-
tion, and marketing of agricultural inputs. 
Approach
In Kenya, the ADP is implemented by CNFA/AGMARK in 
partnership with Equity Bank Ltd, MOA and input supply 
companies, among others. CNFA/AGMARK began its 
activities in 2004 under the Rockefeller Foundation-
funded programme described above. The activities were 
implemented on a pilot basis Western Kenya, where use 
of agricultural productivity enhancing inputs and market 
penetration of input supply companies were low, despite 
the area having good rainfall and soils. The programme 
encouraged input supply companies to venture into this 
region by absorbing part of the market development 
costs through sponsoring small field demonstrations 
with the inputs and organising input fairs in the rural 
areas, where input suppliers would meet farmers and 
promote their products. After about 3 years, these efforts 
led to an influx of input marketing companies into the 
region and increased demand for modern inputs by 
smallholder farmers. 
In June 2007, CNFA/AGMARK out-scaled its activities 
and started implementing a 3-year programme known 
as the Kenya Agro-dealer Strengthening Program (KASP) 
funded by AGRA under the ADP43. The main activities 
under KASP include agro-dealer surveys and mapping; 
agro-dealer training44; generating demand for farm 
inputs through field demonstrations, field days, and 
agricultural shows; facilitating agro-dealers’ access to 
financial credit for business start-up and stocking45; devel-
oping agro-dealer output marketing46; promotion of farm 
inputs savings and loan programme amongst small-
holder farmers47; and facilitating formation of agro-
dealers’ associations48.  KASP is implemented in 64 
districts in 6 provinces (Nairobi and North Eastern 
Provinces are excluded). 
Preliminary Outcomes
As at January 2010, CNFA/AGMARK had supported estab-
lishment of more than 81 new agro-dealers in areas with 
inadequate agro-dealership and trained 2,166 agro-
dealers (Box 3), of which about 1,600 were actively partici-
pating in its activities. The organisation had also facilitated 
agro-dealers to form an umbrella association Kenya 
National Agro-dealer Association, (KENADA), and was 
assisting the Association to develop a business plan. In 
addition, over 20 agro-dealers had been supported to 
establish output marketing units, an innovative comple-
ment to the traditional role of farm input dealership. 
Through KASP, CNFA/AGMARK expects to establish a 
network of sustainable agricultural input suppliers 
serving over 860,000 smallholder farmers by the end of 
the project’s third year49.
In summary, implementation of the ADP in Kenya 
provides some lessons. Although the project is still 
on-going, and some districts are yet to be covered, 
preliminary results from the two study districts indicate 
that more agro-dealers may have so far benefited in high 
than low rainfall areas, with 48 percent of interviewed 
agro-dealers having been trained in Uasin Gishu 
A CNFA/GMARK-trained agro-dealer in Masii Town, 
Machakos  District displaying his accreditation 
certificate.
Accreditation of agro-dealers earns them recognition by 
various seed system actors such as research organisa-
tions, MOA, NGOs and financial institutions. 
Although this seems to be the beginning point for most 
agro-dealer support initiatives, most agro-dealers in 
Machakos  are yet to go through the process.
Box 3. CNFA/AGMARK trained agro-dealer
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compared to 10 percent in Machakos. Further the train-
ings seem to have disproportionately benefited the larger 
(wealthier) agro-dealers, with value of stock (proxy for 
agro-dealer size) among those trained averaging at about 
Ksh 600,000 (Ksh640,000 for Uasin GishuUasin Gishu and 
470,000 for Machakos ), compared to Ksh125,000 
(Ksh160,000 for Uasin Gishu and 110,000 for Machakos 
) among those yet to be trained. An area for further inves-
tigation is the constraints that limit agro-dealer participa-
tion in these trainings, with a view to informing design 
of future programmes and improving participation 
particularly of the smaller agro-dealers. 
5.3. Putting Agro-dealers to the Test: the 
Case of Ministry of Agriculture’s National 
Accelerated Agricultural Input Access 
Programme 
Background
In 2006/07, the Government of Kenya formulated the 
NAAIAP50. The programme will initially be implemented 
in 45 districts over 3 years, at an approximate cost of Ksh 
37 billion. The precursor to NAAIAP was the African Union 
(AU) Special Summit of the Heads of State and 
Government held in Abuja, Nigeria on 13th June, 2006. 
During the summit, The African Union Ministers of 
Agriculture convened for the Africa Fertilizer Summit on 
12 June 2006 and made the ‘Abuja Declaration on 
Fertilizer for the African Green Revolution’. The Declaration 
was anchored on narratives such as:
‘Africa needs a Green Revolution which … consti-
tutes the way of getting African farmers out of the 
poverty trap by achieving food security and other 
relevant the Millennium Development Goals.
Africa’s farmers face a variety of constraints 
including low productivity, limited access to new 
agricultural technologies and weak markets. 
Without adequate inputs, farmers often cannot 
meet the food needs of their own families, much 
less those of a rapidly growing population. To feed 
themselves and their countries, farmers will need 
to shift from low yielding, extensive land practices 
to more intensive, higher-yielding practices, with 
increased use of improved seeds, fertilizers and 
irrigation. 
…farmers have neither access to nor can they afford 
the fertilizers needed to add life to their soils. And 
no region of the world has been able to expand 
agricultural growth rates, and thus tackle hunger, 
without increasing fertilizer use.’ (IFDC 2010: para. 
2 -3) 
The Abuja Declaration blamed Africa’s food woes on 
severely depleted soils due to nutrient mining and 
declared fertiliser a ‘strategic commodity without 
borders’. The Summit declared to accelerate the timely 
access of farmers to fertilisers, so as to raise its level of 
use among farmers from the then 8 kilograms per hectare 
to an average of at least 50 kilograms per hectare by 
2015. This would be achieved through several initiatives, 
key among them being development and scaling up 
input dealers’ and community-based networks across 
rural areas; granting targeted fertiliser subsidies, particu-
larly to poor farmers; establishment of financing facilities 
for input suppliers, with specific attention to women; 
and improving farmer access to quality seeds, irrigation 
facilities, extension services, market information.
Based on these international narratives and declara-
tions, the Government of Kenya adopted its own narra-
tives (such as the one below), which culminated in the 
formulation of NAAIAP:
‘…resource-poor farmers do not have the know-
how and can not afford the cost of these inputs51. 
The consequence is that soils are depleted of nutri-
ents, and farmers obtain low yields. This is the main 
cause, not only of declining agricultural produc-
tivity, but also of increasing food insecurity and 
abject poverty.  … these farmers are so resource-
poor that without external intervention they will 
never be able to use these inputs. They will remain 
poor and would not be able to participate in farming 
as a commercial enterprise. This implies that the 
country will continue to have a high proportion of 
its people living below absolute poverty levels and 
facing food insecurity to the extent that they have 
to depend on relief food.  …The only way this 
section of the population can come out of the cycle 
of poverty and food insecurity is for them to be 
assisted with agricultural inputs for a given period 
of time with comprehensive training and capacity-
building programmes. (Republic of Kenya 2009)
The primary objective of the programme is to improve 
input (fertiliser and seeds) access and affordability of key 
inputs for smallholder farmers to enhance food security/
availability at household level and generate incomes 
from sales of surplus produce. The program aims at 
improving productivity and output at farm level for 2.37 
million smallholder farmers with 1 ha or less of land; by 
first mobilizing farmers’ resources and promoting effi-
ciency in their utilisation and investment in agriculture; 
and second facilitating access and utilisation of farm 
inputs for increased production and poverty reduction 
(Republic of Kenya 2009).
Approach
As outlined in its Design and Implementation Framework 
(Republic of Kenya 2009), NAAIAP uses a two-pronged 
approach to achieve its objectives: the Kilimo plus starter 
kits (inputs grant) and the Kilimo Biashara Package 
(commercial small packs). The Kilimo plus starter kits 
targets the very resource poor subsistence farmers in 
districts with reliable rainfall and owning less than 2.5 
acres of land. The farmers are provided with a grant for 
basic inputs (mainly certified seed and fertiliser) to cover 
at least 1 acre of maize (this includes 10kg of certifies 
seed, 1bag of a base dressing fertiliser and 1bag of a 
top-dressing fertiliser). The grants are administered 
through a voucher system, which enables farmers to get 
inputs from agro-dealers, trained and accredited for the 
purpose52. After supplying the inputs, agro-dealers then 
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redeem the vouchers from the government. Target 
farmers form themselves into groups, which facilitate 
training and ensure that inputs provided are utilized and 
part of the produce realized is channelled through the 
groups’ cereal banks for sale to finance inputs for subse-
quent seasons.
After one season, these farmers are expected to 
increase production from an average of five 90Kg bags 
per acre to about 15 bags per acre. Assuming an average 
family size of 7 persons, 7 bags are adequate for annual 
consumption while the remaining 8 bags can be sold 
and ploughed back in form of improved inputs or 
expanded production53. This way, the resource poor 
farmers can graduate to next category and participate 
in Kilimo Biashara. This package targets farmers with 
better resource endowment and engaged in economi-
cally viable enterprises, but lacking basic farming inputs. 
Through this package, farmers are provided with basic 
inputs at cost and subsidized credit54 from financial insti-
tutions and facilitated (in terms of training and technical 
assistance) to continue with their enterprises.
A Critical Examination of NAAIAP Design, 
Implementation and Preliminary Outcomes.
The implementation of NAAIAP represents a classical 
example of a nationwide campaign by the government 
aimed at helping the resource-poor farmers, in a way 
that supports agro-dealership. But both the process and 
outcomes of the program generate mixed views. We 
critically assess some of the preliminary outcomes of the 
programme, with a view to identifying how application 
of a general narrative in design and implementation of 
such programmes can create wins and losses even for 
the target beneficiaries.
To begin with, adopting an international narrative that 
links low productivity to degraded soils and lack of access 
to modern inputs (specifically fertilisers) and making it 
the national narrative in Kenya is inappropriate, since it 
ignores regional differences emanating from agro-
ecological and socio-cultural settings in the country. 
Actors in different regions of the country have different 
narratives about food production constraints in their 
regions. During our field work in Machakos  District, for 
example, extension officers cited poor rainfall as the main 
cause of low food production and hence food insecurity. 
They also identified low use of modern farm inputs such 
as certified seeds and fertilisers due to high prices, yet 
most farmers are poor; lack of access to agricultural credit; 
degraded soils; and over-reliance on maize at the expense 
of other drought tolerant crops, as the other main food 
production constraints55. Similarly, farmers cited low and 
erratic rainfall as the main challenge, but also mentioned 
expensive seeds and fertilisers; frequent droughts; lack 
of basic farming implements (particularly for land prepa-
ration and soil and water conservation); and few exten-
sion staff as the main causes of low food production and 
food insecurity in the region56. 
These arguments complement findings of several 
studies in the country (for example Owuor 1999; Freeman 
and Omiti 2003; and Kibaara et al. 2009a) which link low 
adoption of improved seeds and fertilisers in low rainfall 
areas mainly to risky farming environment occasioned 
by rainfall unreliability, as opposed to input accessibility. 
In such areas, it is argued, inadequate moisture renders 
yields of most crops unresponsive to fertiliser use and 
in some cases the fertiliser may even harm the crop by 
burning it. This limits widespread use of certified seeds 
and fertilisers. 
On the contrary, in Uasin Gishu, a high rainfall district, 
both the MOA extension staff and farmers were in concur-
rence that food security is normally not a problem in the 
area. They were also in agreement that despite the high 
food production in the district, productivity (particularly 
of maize) was below the potential57. The main constraints 
to higher yields as identified by extension workers were 
high cost of farm inputs, particularly fertiliser, diesel and 
labour; poor farming practices, such as late land prepara-
tion, weeding and pest control; and unpredictable 
weather patterns, particularly onset of rains. Farmers 
cited low use of improved inputs (particularly fertiliser) 
due to high prices and poverty among farmers; and late 
planting as the main constraints to achieving high maize 
yields58.
Secondly, the choice of maize as the only crop to be 
promoted under the programme seems to negate 
farmers’ preferences, especially in the low rainfall areas. 
In these areas, agriculture is highly diversified (Table 6), 
not only as a strategy for mitigating environmental risks, 
but also because it offers a wide range of choice of crops 
that meet the dietary needs of the communities. 
Discussion with senior officials in the MOA identified 
diversification away from maize as ‘the key’ to addressing 
the problem of food insecurity which is common in low 
rainfall areas. Farmers in Machakos District, especially 
those with very small farms, complained that they did 
not plant pigeonpea, a popular legume, because they 
had devoted all their land to a monocrop of NAAIAP 
maize contrary to their usual practice59. Focusing on 
maize therefore is again another product of transplanting 
a high rainfall area preference into the national food 
security policy. There is need to investigate whether the 
programme would be more beneficial to farmers 
Table 6. Proportion (%) of land area under main food crops in rift valley and eastern provinces of 
Kenya (average for 2006-07 Seasons)
Province Proportion (%) of Land Area under:
Maize Beans Pigeon 
Peas
Cow 
peas
Wheat Millet Sorghum Cassava Sweet 
Potatoes
Yams
Rift Valley 58.8 26.0 0.0 0.2 11.3 2.3 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.0
Eastern 38.8 22.1 14.1 10.6 1.1 5.7 6.1 0.8 0.6 0.1
Source: CountryStat (2009)
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(especially in low rainfall areas) if they have the liberty 
to choose seed of at least 2-3 key crops.
Thirdly, there was a problem of beneficiary targeting 
at two levels. At the national level, the districts chosen 
for the project were those identified as having reliable 
rainfall or irrigation facilities. This means that farmers 
and agro-dealers in low rainfall areas would be excluded 
from the programme. It could also be an indirect conces-
sion by the programme designers that the role of agro-
dealers in spurring a GR in ASAL of Kenya is insignificant. 
At the local (District) level, identification of beneficiaries 
proved to be challenging, especially in higher rainfall 
areas where poverty levels are generally lower. Due to 
the short period of time allocated for identification of 
beneficiaries, Village Elders and Assistant Chiefs played 
a big role in identifying beneficiaries at community level. 
This resulted in nepotism, with some non resource-poor 
farmers benefiting at the expense of deserving resource-
poor farmers. However, the problem of beneficiary 
targeting is not unique to NAAIAP. Similar programmes 
in the country (such as the Maize Seed for the Poor project 
implemented by CIMMYT and partners, and the seed 
fairs and vouchers projects commonly implemented by 
CRS) have experienced the challenge of defining who 
the needy farmers are, and the criteria for selecting the 
target area and farmers.
Fourthly, the assumption that surplus maize will be 
harvested in Eastern Kenya is highly questionable 
because of unreliability of rainfall in most areas. As illus-
trated in Box 3 below, farmers in Machakos did not even 
harvest enough maize grain to meet their food require-
ments in the 2008/09 season. Further, the assumption 
that poor smallholder farmers will use proceeds from 
sale of surplus maize grain to buy inputs for subsequent 
season or to expand their farming business is not guar-
anteed. This is because many of the farmers, due to 
poverty and lack of alternative income sources are likely 
to use the money to meet other priority needs such as 
school fees and medical expenses.
As for the outcomes, about 21,500 farmers had already 
benefited from the inputs grant by September 2009, and 
the target for 2009/2010 season was 170,000 farmers. 
Further, 1,600 agro-dealers had been trained and certi-
fied by CNFA/AGMARK in partnership with NAAIAP, of 
whom 156 had participated in supplying inputs to 
farmers60. However, due to weaknesses in programme 
Implementation of NAAIAP in Kenya has so far generated mixed 
outcomes, creating big wins for some and loses for others, and 
this provides useful lessons for up-scaling the project. For 
farmers, the possibility and extent of benefits are driven to a 
large extent by rainfall regime, with huge benefits accruing in 
high rainfall areas, as illustrated in this story.   
Maria*, a smallholder farmer and Secretary of a farmers’ group 
in Uasin Gishu District displays her part of what can be termed a 
‘bumper harvest’ of maize. The farmer had benefited from 
NAAIAP inputs grant in 2008 season and is now riding on the 
benefits of the programme to advance her maize farming.
‘Before NAAIAP, I used to harvest about 4 bags from my 0.5 acre 
plot (8bags/acre). After receiving training on how to use 
fertiliser and other agronomic practices, and receiving the 
inputs grant, I improved my production to 13 bags (26 bags/
acre) from the plot’ Maria says.  From the harvest, Maria got 
enough grain for her family’s food requirement. She also had 
surplus grain which she sold and used the money to pay school 
fees and buy seed and fertiliser for producing the crop she is 
displaying.
According to Maria, most NAAIAP beneficiaries in her group 
doubled their maize yields, mainly because they were able to apply both base and top dressing fertilisers as opposed to 
only one type of fertiliser that they used to apply before NAAIAP. The beneficiaries have also formalized their group and 
started making money contributions to finance the group’s activities.  At the time we visited the area, the group had 
already raised Ksh 75,000 (US$1,000), with which they intended to construct a greenhouse and start mushroom 
production. Maria’s group is also hoping to start a cereal bank for collective marketing of their grain. They have already 
signed a contract with the World Food Program (WFP) to supply maize grain this season.
But Maria’s counterparts in Machakos were not so lucky. The NAAIAP beneficiaries in Yathui Division in 2007/08 rain 
season managed to improve their production only in the first season (most farmers doubled their yields by using 
certified seed, fertiliser and better agronomic practices). However, in the second season (2008/09), there was near total 
crop failure due to poor rains (which is not a rare phenomenon in the region), and only a few farmers harvested up to 
1bag of maize. Another group of beneficiaries, Kiomo Maize growers in Kangundo Division (now a district) who 
received the inputs grant in 2008/09 season harvested only up to 4 bags per acre compared to 15-20 bags per acre in a 
good season. However, the group was happy to have learnt how to use fertiliser and other crop husbandry techniques, 
adding that they were the only ones who had harvested some grain within their locality that season. The beneficiaries 
also formed a group, which is engaged in merry-go-round, table banking, giving loans to members, providing labour 
on each other’s farms in turns and buying subsidized fertiliser from the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) in 
bulk (normally, it would be expensive for a farmer to purchase the fertiliser individually, and it is impossible to buy 
subsidized fertiliser in very small amounts).
Box 4. Wins and losses: a comparison of NAAIAP outcomes in high and low rainfall areas
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design and implementation challenges, there were 
winners and losers. Farmers in high rainfall areas seem 
to have benefited more from the project as opposed to 
their counterparts in low rainfall areas, largely due to 
differences in rainfall patterns between the two regions.
Similarly, agro-dealers in high rainfall areas benefited 
more than those in low rainfall areas. For instance, more 
agro-dealers were trained in Uasin Gishu than in 
Machakos  (48 and 10 percent of those interviewed in 
Uasin Gishu and Machakos  respectively). Further, agro-
dealer participation in input supply was more in Uasin 
Gishu (40 percent of those interviewed) than in Machakos 
(about 3 percent of those interviewed). In both regions, 
large-scale agro-dealers benefited more than small-scale 
agro-dealers (at the time of the survey, agro-dealers who 
had participated in supplying inputs had stock valued 
about Ksh870,000, while the stock of non-participating 
agro-dealers averaged about Ksh100,000). 
In summary, NAAIAP was designed with the agro-
dealer as a hub, but participation of agro-dealers so far 
in the study districts was both low and skewed. This has 
been occasioned by a number of factors. First, those who 
do not meet the minimum qualifications such as registra-
tion with relevant authorities are locked out. This affects 
a bigger proportion of agro-dealers in Machakos where 
there is a smaller proportion of legal agro-dealers than 
in Uasin Gishu. Secondly, there is a lack of capacity in 
terms of working capital or business relationships to 
secure credit arrangements for purchasing the inputs, 
and vehicles to transport inputs to farming communities. 
Again, the constraint is more intense in Machakos where 
a larger proportion of agro-dealers operate in small-scale. 
Thirdly, tedious procedures and delays in redemption of 
vouchers  from the government by participating agro-
dealers (it took 3-6 months to be repaid after supplying 
inputs) jeopardises credit arrangements and business 
relations between agro-dealers and input suppliers/
financiers and this discourages some agro-dealers from 
participating in subsequent seasons, particularly in 
Machakos61. 
In view of these outcomes, there is a need for the 
government to identify strategies that will best target 
the resource poor farmers, with minimal leakages to the 
non-poor. The program should also find ways of 
increasing participation of agro-dealers, particularly 
those operating at a small and medium scale, for instance 
by allowing them to form partnerships. Further, the 
government should simplify the process of voucher 
redemption by devolving it to the districts and/or 
contracting the redemption function to a private financial 
institution. The following case study presents efforts by 
agricultural research organisations in partnership with 
seed companies, aimed at developing a more effective 
mechanism for delivering subsidised inputs to poor 
smallholder farmers.
5.4. In Search of Agro-dealer Friendly 
Subsidy Programmes: the Case of 
CIMMYT’s Maize Seed for the Poor project
Background
The Maize Seed for the Poor (MSP) project was developed 
in 2008 under the title ‘Testing pro-poor market segmen-
tation of maize seed’. MSP is a pilot project which aims 
at exploring viable market-based mechanisms that would 
increase poor farmers’ access to improved seed and 
encourage growth of a competitive seed industry. The 
project is testing different approaches to determine the 
methods that are most effective in the provision of input 
subsidies to resource-poor farmers, with minimum leak-
ages to the non-poor; least distortion to the existing 
marketing system; and without creating dependency. 
Successful implementation of the MSP is hoped to 
provide a model for a Kenyan input subsidy programme 
similar to the one executed in Malawi in 2006 and 2007. 
(CIMMYT 2009; 2010)
MSP was born out of a stakeholder workshop initiated 
by CIMMYT, USAID, IFPRI, and STAK, with financial support 
of American Seed Trade Association (ASTA), held in 
Nairobi on June 26, 2008. Stakeholders in the initiative 
were drawn from the seed sector, NGOs, Ministry of 
Agriculture, agro-dealers and researchers. The project is 
implemented under a partnership between CIMMYT, 
KARI, IFPRI and STAK, with financial assistance from the 
USAID and the ASTA.  The following narrative provides 
the background on which the project was formulated: 
Renewed global recognition of the need to enhance 
global agricultural productivity has placed agricul-
tural science and technology back on the interna-
tional development agenda. However, thinking has 
moved from large-scale public investment in 
productivity enhancement, to find effective ways 
to transform productivity-enhancing research into 
deployable products that are profitable to private 
sector and target the poor. The value of seed traded 
in East Africa is very small, and there is an urgent 
need to encourage greater trade and use of 
improved seed to increase food security. In the last 
decade, the private sector has greatly contributed 
to the number of varieties released to the farmers 
in East Africa. …While legal frameworks promoting 
plant breeding do exist, balancing access to 
protected varieties by vulnerable farmers, while 
enabling investors in breeding to benefit from their 
innovation, is critical (De Groote et al. 2008: v-vi).
Approach
The MSP is a form of subsidy that uses a voucher system 
to deliver improved maize seed to needy farmers. The 
project uses two classification methods: one in which all 
farmers of the community are invited to participate 
(tiered-pricing) and the second, a direct identification 
system that is designed to target only resource-poor 
farmers. Direct identification is done by a committee of 
village elders and other knowledgeable people who 
create a list of characteristics that define a family as 
resource-poor. Local households that fit the description 
are then asked to participate. All participating farmers 
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are randomly assigned a coupon valued at Ksh 60 or 120. 
The project is implemented in Embu (Eastern Province) 
and Kisii (Nyanza Province). More than 5,000 farmers, 
receiving over 15,000 vouchers participated. 
Each farm family has the possibility of receiving two 
or five of these coupons. The use of multiple coupons is 
so that farmers can buy different varieties, or buy them 
at different times. As an experimental control, some 
farmers receive no coupons at all (these farmers are given 
either a kilogram of cooking fat or sugar). Participants 
can use only one coupon per 2 kg bag of seed, regardless 
of how many coupons they initially receive. The price of 
2 kg maize seed pack costs about Ksh 200-400 depending 
on the variety and the farmers must therefore pay the 
remaining amount when they take vouchers to accred-
ited agro-dealers (trained by CNFA/AGMARK) to buy the 
seed. Stockists redeem the vouchers at Equity Bank 
(where CIMMYT has opened a Ksh 1.5 million account 
for the project). 
Challenges and Preliminary Outcomes
Documented project reports indicate that the project 
exhibited some challenges, but is also generating good 
outcomes for both farmers and agro-dealers. Some of 
the challenges were that farmers did not initially have 
clear understanding of the working of the voucher 
system (use of one voucher per seed packet); voucher 
amounts did not only seem little but they also excluded 
fertiliser which is a key input that accompanies improved 
maize seed; the 2kg pack was limiting for poor farmers 
with very little land and who would require less seed 
than permissible by the number of vouchers received; 
the voucher redemption process was slow; and there 
was improper vetting of the needy farmers – cases of 
nepotism were reported.  
The project is fairly new and its benefits to agro-dealers 
and farmers are yet to be fully assessed. Nevertheless, 
initial indications point at some benefits accruing to 
agro-dealers. Most importantly, participating agro-
dealers had their businesses boosted through increased 
sales, which resulted from increased seed demand from 
old and new customers, following publicity and provision 
of input subsidy through the project. The agro-dealers 
also benefited by linkages to a financier (Equity Bank), 
with whom they have established good business 
relationships.
In conclusion, this section has shown the great deal 
of effort there is towards realizing a Green Revolution in 
Kenya. This effort is mainly in form of philanthropic 
programmes that support and involve agro-dealers in 
the cereal sector, allegedly to accelerate input access 
and use among poor smallholder farmers. The underlying 
vision of these programmes is to have a market-based 
supply system, delivering productivity enhancing inputs 
to smallholder farmers. Most actors supporting the phil-
anthropic programmes argue that many smallholder 
farmers in Africa are too poor to participate in markets, 
thus, leaving them to market forces will only exacerbate 
inequalities between large and small scale farmers. They 
hence advocate for public investment in form of smart 
subsidies like vouchers to ‘jumpstart’ the system. 
However, there seems to be challenges in design and 
implementation of these programmes, which result in 
disproportionate wins for larger agro-dealers, and 
farmers and agro-dealers in high rainfall areas. 
The results of these programmes raise two funda-
mental questions:
 • Will the programmes create sustainable input demand 
and supply systems that will autonomously ensure 
seed security among poor smallholder farmers or a 
dependency syndrome which condition smallholder 
farmers to perennial seed and fertiliser handouts?
 • Will agro-dealers really spur a Green Revolution in 
Kenya, and if so, for which regions, and/or farmers?
The next section summarises this study, while 
addressing these questions.
6. Conclusion 
Owing to the worsening performance of the food 
producing sector, the government, with backing of devel-
opment and charitable organisations has been imple-
menting Green Revolution (GR) activities aimed at 
increasing agricultural productivity and rural incomes. 
These activities greatly emphasise on increasing farmers’ 
access to and application of high quality modern farming 
inputs, particularly seeds and fertilisers. In the context 
of a liberalised economy, input stockists, also known as 
agro-dealers, are seen to have a crucial role in distributing 
these inputs to farmers. 
Kenyan farmers are highly heterogeneous in terms of 
agro-ecological, economic and socio-cultural environ-
ments in which they operate and their preferred crop 
enterprises. One is therefore tempted to ask the question: 
Can agro-dealers deliver the Green Revolution in Kenya; 
and if so, for which crops, farmers and/or regions? In 
seeking to answer this question, this paper examined 
the evolution and characteristics of agro-dealers in the 
cereals subsector and explored how they command a 
central position in policy narratives put forward by key 
actors in the policy arena, each advocating a new GR for 
Kenya. A number of findings emanate from this study, 
which are discussed below.
First, both formal and informal seed systems are impor-
tant channels for delivering cereal seed to Kenyan 
farmers. The formal systems provide just over 60 percent 
of the maize seed used in the country, and is delivered 
mainly through agro-dealers. However, the systems 
mostly serve farmers in high rainfall areas located in the 
greater Western and Central regions of the country. On 
the other hand, informal systems (which do not involve 
agro-dealers) provide just fewer than 40 percent of maize 
seeds and well over 65 percent of the seeds of other 
cereals. The informal system is the main source of seeds 
for farmers in low rainfall and marginal areas, located 
mainly in the greater Eastern region of the country. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the informal systems, 
the legal, regulatory and policy frameworks, which are 
anchored on international seed policies and conventions 
(which have a largely commercial orientation), favour 
the formal systems. Based on this finding, it may be 
argued that in the foreseeable future, agro-dealers may 
Working Paper 014 www.future-agricultures.org27
only spur a GR mainly for maize farmers and in high rain-
fall areas. 
Second, a strong core coalition of actors exists in the 
seed sector in Kenya, focused on the entire seed value 
chain. These include the Ministry of Agriculture, research 
institutions, seed companies and their network of agro-
dealers, donor and philanthropic organisations and 
farmers. The informal seed systems are dominated by 
the government and donor/non-governmental organisa-
tions. On the other hand, the formal seed system is domi-
nated by a few major private companies and a parastatal, 
the Kenya Seed Company (KSC), and their agro-dealer 
networks. However, there are barriers preventing new 
actors from entering the seed business. The policy and 
business environment favours KSC over other companies 
and exhibits excessive government interference. This 
seemingly contradicts the government’s intention of 
promoting private sector investment in the seed industry. 
Actors in the seed industry employ different 
approaches in their activities, depending on geograph-
ical region, but due to different politics and interests at 
play, there seems to be convergence on the role of the 
agro-dealer as the primary carrier of improved seeds to 
farmers. In the greater Western and Central regions of 
Kenya, the actors centre mainly on certified seed and 
fertiliser market development which entails develop-
ment of agro-dealer networks. On the other hand, in the 
greater Eastern Kenya, private sector activity is limited. 
The government and donor/non-governmental organi-
sations focus their activities on seed aid and informal 
seed systems to fill the void created by the private sector. 
But the seed aid is also slowly moving towards ‘market-
based’ approaches such as seed fairs and vouchers, which 
involve support for and active participation of agro-
dealers. Interestingly, while the actors promote the agro-
dealer agenda, they also support parallel activities that 
seem to undermine development of agro-dealership. 
These actions may be interpreted as low confidence in 
agro-dealers among the state and philanthropic organi-
sations. The justification for this situation is that since 
the private sector is driven by profits, it will hence concen-
trate on seed of crops and regions for which demand is 
sufficient enough to attract investment in agro-dealer-
ship. The high farming risk in low rainfall and marginal 
areas severely constrains growth in demand for certified 
seed.  In the low rainfall and marginal areas, distribution 
of improved seed is likely to be dominated by public and 
humanitarian organisations. Therefore, if agro-dealers 
are to spur a GR in Kenya, it will be mainly in the high 
rainfall areas.
Third, Kenyan agro-dealer owners (popularly known 
as ‘stockists’ or ‘Agro-vets’) are fairly young, well educated 
mostly male entrepreneurs dealing in seeds, pesticides, 
fertilisers, veterinary drugs, animal feeds, building mate-
rials, general merchandise and human drugs. Diversity 
of commodities stocked reflects a risk coping mechanism 
for business survival, given the seasonal and erratic 
demand for agricultural inputs, and also helps in 
spreading out business costs such as those associated 
with transport, handling and storage. Therefore, any 
initiatives aimed at supporting agro-dealers should not 
focus only on seed and fertilisers, but the totality of the 
business. Another important finding is that less than a 
half of agro-dealer owners are involved in day-to-day 
management of their businesses, and are therefore 
unavailable to field technical queries from customers. If 
agro-dealers are to deliver a GR in Kenya, the trainings 
in agro-dealer capacity building programmes should not 
target only the business owners: the ‘managers’ should 
also be targeted, especially with respect to the technical 
modules.  Agro-dealers face several challenges, which 
limit their effectiveness in delivering inputs and informa-
tion to producers and hence the GR in Kenya. The key 
ones are weaknesses in the regulatory framework, lack 
of working capital, high and erratic supply prices, low 
and erratic demand for modern inputs and inadequate 
supply of inputs at the peak of planting season. 
Fourth, significant investments have gone into 
building the agro-dealer network in Kenya, through a 
number of new programmes that have put agro-dealers 
at the centre of project design. These programmes are 
based on narratives that link low agricultural productivity 
to farmers’ lack of access to modern inputs (specifically 
fertilisers and seeds). The actors implementing these 
programmes see an increase in agro-dealer density as 
key to increasing accessibility of inputs and therefore 
have undertaken building agro-dealer networks in rural 
areas. There seems to be a general consensus among 
various actors that because poor farmers are unable to 
effectively participate in input markets, there is need to 
provide them with subsidised inputs in order to stimulate 
demand for the inputs. However, the actors are in favour 
of market-friendly approaches, which promote agro-
dealership and condition farmers for input markets. 
Universalising of agro-dealer narrative in the programmes 
overlooks the heterogeneity of the ‘poor smallholder 
farmers’ and agro-dealers. This has resulted in enormous 
challenge of beneficiary targeting and disproportionate 
wins for farmers and agro-dealers in high rainfall areas 
and large agro-dealers. Greater attention must be paid 
to meeting the needs of farmers in lower potential areas 
(who represent the vast majority of Kenya’s agricultural 
producers) by developing innovative alternative business 
models beyond the archetypal agro-dealer establish-
ment, which focuses on a single entrepreneur capable 
of running a profitable business from the sale of agricul-
tural inputs to a customer base which is willing and able 
to afford them. Such models would focus on the sale of 
complementary non-agricultural products or services 
with agricultural inputs to create a successful business 
or the establishment of group-based agro-dealerships 
– e.g. for farmers’ organisations, women’s groups or youth 
groups – which might operate part-time or on a not-for-
profit basis as a service to their community. Alternatively, 
mobile agro-dealers might provide regular or periodic 
services to more remote areas than cannot sustain 
permanent agro-dealerships (possibly coming on market 
days when large numbers of people gather together). 
In short, efforts must be made to move away from the 
‘one-size-fits-all’ agro-dealer model as it is currently 
construed.    
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Finally, notwithstanding their (potential and actual) 
benefits, the Green Revolution programmes have been 
viewed by critics as a ‘Trojan horse’ for genetically modi-
fied (GM) seeds or simply a strategy to ‘roll out a gene 
revolution’ in Africa. Such critics have a premonition that 
behind the actors championing the apparently charitable 
Green Revolution programmes are profit-driven trans-
national corporations (TNCs), battling for the control of 
a lucrative seed market in African countries. These 
programmes are seen as a tool for opening a market for 
GM seeds and chemical fertilisers, substances feared to 
be potentially harmful to African indigenous seed popu-
lations, biodiversity and the environment, in addition to 
making smallholder farmers dependent on these costly 
inputs. As illustrated in this study, AATF is, for example, 
using agro-dealers in the delivery of Strigaway maize 
technology as a test-case for deploying new GM seeds 
from the WEMA project. But the extent to which agro-
dealers have capacity for local-level implementation of 
biosafety regulations has yet to be determined and is 
therefore an area requiring further research62.
Kenya in many ways is the ‘poster child’ for the New 
Green Revolution in Africa, with its public-private alliance 
attempting to establish local, rural entrepreneurship. A 
range of initiatives build on a strong private seed sector 
and a well developed and extensive network of small-
scale agro-dealers. In reality, the agro-dealers are spread 
unevenly throughout Kenya, inevitably concentrated in 
the higher potential agricultural areas in the centre and 
west of the country. Although they are provided with a 
range of support, including training in business manage-
ment through NGOs, they must rely on a diverse commer-
cial base, offering a range of non-agricultural products 
to create a successful business. Making a business out 
of selling seeds and fertilisers is risky, and especially so 
in the dryland areas where demand is low and variable. 
Therefore, links with particular seed companies is essen-
tial and central to these enterprises. The changing struc-
ture of the Kenya seed industry (dominated by the 
parastatal Kenya Seed Company, but involving numerous 
other private seed companies) and the entry of large 
multinational players is changing this dynamic. This acts 
to narrow the choice of seeds and crop types to farmers 
in all areas. With the Biosafety Bill recently approved and 
the appointment of officers of a new National Biosafety 
Authority, the prospect of GM crops being pushed 
through agribusiness networks is a major emerging 
issues, with questions as to whether agrodealers have 
the capacity to provide local regulatory control of new 
seeds. Farmers’ own informal seed systems must operate 
in parallel, and particularly poorer farmers in more 
marginal areas must rely on informal systems as their 
primary source of seed.
Working Paper 014 www.future-agricultures.org29
Appendix 1:
Appendix 2:
 Aggregate cereal production and yield trends in Kenya (1987-2005)
1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
Production (Million tonnes) 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.5
Yield (Tonness/ha) 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6
Source: Computed from FAOSTAT data
Maize production and consumption trends in Kenya (1961-2003)
Source: Created from FAOSTAT data
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End Notes
1 http://www.safaricomfoundation.org/fileadmin/
template/main/downloads/Kenya_VISION_2030-final_
report-October_2007.pdf (accessed 31 July 2010)
2 From estimates by Kenya Maize Development 
Programme (KMDP) and FAOSTAT average for 2004-07. 
3 Aggregate cereal data considered in this section are 
for Maize, Sorghum, Millet, Wheat and Rice.
4  Districts as constituted in 2006 before the recent 
sub-divisions. Uasin Gishu a traditional ‘breadbasket’ 
district has a total of 327,000ha of agricultural land, all 
of which is classified as high potential, while Machakos 
has a total of 1,350,000ha of agricultural land, of which 
about 9 percent is high potential, 57 percent is medium 
potential and 34 percent is low potential (Republic of 
Kenya 2008a). Of the 55 agro-dealers interviewed, 30 
were from Machakos and 25 from Uasin Gishu.
5  Source: Remarks by Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta, Deputy 
prime minister and minister for finance during the 
signing ceremony for the Kenya Agricultural 
Productivity and Agribusiness Project loan Agreement 
between the World Bank and the government of Kenya 
On 6th July 2009.
6 GRASP is a net network of civil society organisations 
Africa, Europe and North America, advocating for the 
interests of small agricultural producers in Africa.
7  The main references for this section are Bay 1998; van 
der Burg 1998; TechnoServe-Kenya 2000; Tripp 2001; 
CRS, ICRISAT and ODI 2002; Muhammad et al. 2003; and 
Smale and Jayne 2004. Additional information also 
came from discussions with government officials in the 
Ministry of Agriculture and KEPHIS; Kenya National 
Federation of Agricultural Producers, KENFAP); and field 
observations in Machakos and Uasin Gishu. Several 
websites were also visited and have been referenced.
8 Kenya has 5 other Provinces: Nairobi, Nyanza, Coast, 
North Eastern and Eastern. 
9 Interview: Ms. Anne Onyango, Policy Director, Ministry 
of Agriculture. 
10 Appendix 3 shows an imagined map of actor-
networks in Kenya’s cereal seed systems –that was 
prepared before fieldwork. This mental map was 
intended to help us identify key actors and review their 
general roles and relations in the country’s cereal seed 
systems. The map of the actual actor-networks that are 
influencing the agro-dealer agenda in Kenya, as 
revealed by the pilot study findings, is shown in 
Appendix 4.   
11 KEPHIS is a State Corporation established in October 
1996, following liberalisation of the seed industry. 
KEPHIS offers the following key services to the industry: 
administration of Plant Breeders’ Rights; National 
Performance Trials for variety release and 
commercialisation; registration of seed merchants and 
seed growers; licensing of seed sellers, seed inspections 
and testing; and farmer advisory services (KEPHIS 
Service Charter.
12 A DAC performs several regulatory functions in the 
agricultural sector at the district level on behalf of the 
MOA. It is chaired by the District Commissioner (DC), 
while the District Agricultural Officer (DAO) is the 
Secretary. Farmers are also represented in the DAC (See 
Agriculture Act, Cap 318).
13 For example, in the September-October 2010 
planting season in Eastern Kenya, the government was 
supplying subsidized fertiliser to farmers through the 
NCPB and directly distributing free seed to ‘resource 
poor farmers’ using Government trucks and staff 
(provincial administrators and MOA extension staff). 
The MOA was also implementing the National 
Accelerated Agricultural Inputs Access Programme 
(NAAIAP), a fully subsidized voucher-based seed 
(maize) and fertiliser distribution programme that 
entailed agro-dealer support and participation as 
highlighted in section 5. 
14 ASARECA member countries are Burundi, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
15 CAADP’s Pillar 4 is: Improving agriculture research, 
technology dissemination and adoption.
16 See AFSTA website: www.afsta.org. STAK also hosts 
the AFSTA Secretariat.
17 KSU is a public seed enterprise under KARI that 
produces and markets commercial seed of dryland 
crops.
18 Several actors sponsor field demonstrations and field 
days. These include research organisations, MOA, NGOs 
(such as ACDI/VOCA, FIPS Africa and CNFA/AGMARK), 
seed companies and agro-dealers. CNFA (Citizens 
Network for Foreign Affairs) Inc. is a global NGO based 
in Washington DC., while AGMARK (Agricultural Market 
Development Trust) is a Kenyan non profit-making 
organisation and local affiliate of CNFA. CNFA/AGMARK 
focuses on the commercial private sector provision of 
goods and services and creates linkages between 
actors in farm input supply chain and public sector 
services (see www.cnfa.org). 
Additional information in this section came from 
discussions with S. Collins (Country Director, Kenya) and 
S. Guantai (Marketing and Communications 
Coordinator), ACDI/VOCA; and S. Ngwalla (Director, 
Business Training and Output Marketing), CNFA/
AGMARK.
19 From interviews with Ministry of Agriculture 
Extension staff in Machakos and Uasin Gishu Districts
20 Article 3 (3) (f ), (g)
21 Article 4 (4)
22 Article 2
23 Regulation 18 (1) 
24 From discussion with Dr. Ahenda of KEPHIS.
25 Part E of the Seed and Plant Varieties (Seeds) 
Regulations, 2009. US$1 = approximately Ksh 76
26 Managing/running business refers mainly to direct 
involvement in serving customers.
27 Agro-dealer trainings are mainly conducted by 
agro-chemical and seed companies, KEPHIS, Ministry of 
Agriculture extension staff and (more recently) some 
NGOs. 
28 This includes items such as general foodstuffs, soaps 
and detergents, home appliances, utensils and skin care 
products, among others.
29 Agricultural here connotes crop and livestock.
30 As many as 10 licenses may be required, according to 
S. Ngwalla of CNFA/AGMARK.
31 Interview: Dr. Ahenda, KEPHIS.
32 According to DAO, Eldoret East District (created 
recently from Uasin Gishu).
33 Before KEPHIS was established, most seed stockists 
operated under a license from KSC, then a monopoly.
34 Out of the 8 agro-dealers in the sample who had 
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received loans from financial institutions, 4 had used 
motor
vehicles as collateral, while 1 had used his business 
premises to secure the loan.
35 Maize seed varieties traded in Uasin Gishu were H511, 
H513, H515, H516, H520, H612, H613, H614, H624,
H626, H627, H628, H629, H6210, H6212, H6213, H9401 
(all from KSC) and PAN 691, PAN 67 (both from
Pannar), while Maize seed varieties traded in Machakos 
were DH01, DH02, DH04, H513 (all from KSC); Duma 41, 
Duma 43 (both from SeedCo), DK 8031 (from 
Monsanto), PHB 3253 (from Pioneer) and PAN 4M19 
(from Pannar). Some agro-dealers in Uasin Gishu, where 
a high number of varieties were traded seemed to have 
forgotten a few of the varieties they had traded in, 
meaning that more varieties than reported here could 
have been traded.
36 Market penetration here is represented by 
percentage of interviewed agro-dealers who stocked 
seeds of a particular seed company in 2009, regardless 
of the number of varieties or quantities of seeds sold.
37  Discussion with Ministry of Agriculture Extension 
Staff in Uasin Gishu.
38 Information source: Agro-dealer survey data and 
discussions with farmers in Uasin Gishu.
39 Information source: Agro-dealer survey data and 
discussions with farmers in Machakos.
40 Discussion with Mr. S. Ngwalla, CNFA/AGMARK.
41 Source: Interview with NAAIAP Program Coordinator; 
and NAAIAP Programme Design and Implementation 
Framework 2009/2010.
42 This project is implemented in partnership with IFAD 
(see www.agra-alliance.org/content/news/detail/822.
43 By this time, the Rockefeller Foundation had already 
partnered with Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to 
form AGRA, through which it was channelling support 
for some of its African programmes.
44 This covers the six business modules already 
discussed under the initial Rockefeller-funded 
programme plus two technical modules, all offered at a 
total subsidized cost of Ksh 3,000 (about US$40).
45 These include Matching Grants for agro-dealer 
start-ups, in which CNFA/AGMARK and the agro-dealer 
contribute 50 percent of the start-up capital each; 
credit guarantees of 50 percent by CNFA/AGMARK to 
input supply companies for inputs supplied to certified 
agro-dealers; and certification of agro-dealers, which 
qualifies them for business loans at Equity Bank.
46 Under this initiative, agro-dealers are provided with 
Matching Grants to start up farm output marketing 
activities. These activities include buying and selling 
farm output and value addition. As examples, some 
agrodealer have been linked to the World Food 
Programme, WFP, and facilitated to buy food grain from 
smallholder farmers to bulk it for the organisation; 
while others have been facilitated to set up small-scale 
maize milling businesses.
47 In this programme, some farmer groups (for example 
in dry areas of Eastern Kenya) save Ksh 10 per member
per day. At the end of every week, the group collects 
the saved money and deposits it with an accredited 
agrodealer. At the end of the year, each farmer will have 
saved about Ksh 3,650 (which can purchase improved 
seed and fertiliser for about 0.5 acres of maize), which is 
redeemed from the agro-dealer in form of inputs at 
planting time.
48 The associations are formed at district and national 
levels. The associations are expected to bring 
selfregulation
among agro-dealers, reducing cases of trade in ‘fake’ 
inputs. Further, the associations will lobby the 
government for favourable business policies. A key 
lobby issue will be pressurising the government to stop 
direct seed distribution, which is seen as a threat to 
agro-dealership.
49 See www.cnfa.org/kasp for more project 
achievements.
50 From discussion with Mr. Makheti, Program 
Coordinator, NAAIAP.
51 Inputs referred to here are fertilisers and certified 
seeds.
52 For accreditation, stockists must have been in inputs 
business for one year; be registered with registrar of 
societies; certified by KEPHIS and PCPB; Kenya Revenue 
Authority (KRA) compliant, certified by CNFA/AGMARK, 
and recommended by their respective DACs.
53 Discussion with NAAIAP Coordinator, Mr. P. Makheti.
54 Farmers can access this facility through Equity Bank at 
10 percent interest rate, which is lower than average 
commercial lending rates. The credit is in form of inputs 
acquired from CNFA/AGMARK certified agrodealers. The 
agro-dealers later claim from Equity the money for 
inputs supplied to farmers.
55 Discussion with extension officers in all the 8 new 
districts curved out of the larger Machakos District.
56 Discussion with members of Kiomo Maize Growers 
group in Kangundo District, and a group of NAAIAP 
beneficiaries in Mwala District. (Both districts have been 
curved out of the larger Machakos)
57 Extension officers estimated the current yields of 
maize to range between 15-30 90-kg bags per acre, 
depending on the agro-ecological zone, while the 
potential is about 30-35 90-kg bags per acre.
58 Discussion with Maria (not her real name), Secretary 
of a farmers’ group in Uasin Gishu.
59 Discussion with Kiomo Maize Growers group of 
Kangundo District
60 According the Program Coordinator, Mr. Makheti
61 In Machakos, most agro-dealers who participated in 
NAAIAP in 2008 declined to participate in 2009 and the
district had to engage large agro-dealers from outside 
the district (such as Nairobi) to supply inputs.
62 Phase II of this study explore the capacity of Kenyan 
agro-dealers to implement national biosafety
regulations.
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